Pirsig's response to Doug's query about d'Espagnat's "Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics."

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Robert M. Pirsig
Box FlameProof
City, State, ZIP-zip
U.S.A.
August 18, 1999

{Renselle comments in braces. Pirsig comments are in red. Pirsig —scratchouts— look like this. Added quotemarks to Pirsig's quotes of d'Espagnat's,
Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics,
pages 290-2. I.e., quoted black text is d'Espagnat.}

  Dear Doug Renselle,

       Thank you for your letter. I took out the book you recommended and find it pleasant to see the gulf between physics and philosophy fade in it with physics approaching the "natural philosophy" it once was. d'Espagnat seems to be moving toward a scientifically orthodox union of Quantum Theory with the MOQ although he does not reach that union or suggest anywhere that value might be the central reality he talks about.

       Here are some points of agreement and difference with the propositions he sets forth on page 290:

"Proposition (i). The verb "to exist" has a meaning, irrespective of the difficulty we usually encounter in ascertaining whether or not a given concept qualifies as one of its possible subjects. Agreed

"Proposition (ii). Reality — defined as the totality of what exists — is essentially independent of us in its behavior. In other words, though we are parts of it, we are definitely not its regulators, in any sense. Agreed

"Proposition (iii). What we presently know is not in contradiction with the hypothesis that this reality has fundamental laws [they are, of course, independent of us as a consequence of proposition (ii)] Some of this reality, static reality, has fundamental laws. Dynamic reality does not. Inorganic and biological patterns of reality are independent of us ("us" being patterns of society and intellect) but society and intellect are not. {d'Espagnat's brackets}

"Proposition (iv). What we know is also not in contradiction with the assumption that we can reach an increasingly good knowledge of the general structure of these laws. Indeed, this assumption is free from contradictions stemming from the measurement theory, since the difficulties of this theory bear on individual, not on general, attributes. Moreover, it accounts in a rather natural way for the regularities we observe. There is thus no ground for discarding it. Agreed

"Proposition (v). What we presently know does contradict, however, the assumption that reality as defined above coincides in every respect with empirical reality. In the MOQ Dynamic Quality is the fundamental empirical reality. By "empirical reality" we mean here a description How can empirical reality be a description? This seems to me to be a blunder. The positivists must have him confused which is made in terms of particles, fields, classical physical objects, and so on, and in which individual attributes appear. In the last resort the circumstance that no such description coincides with reality is due, as we saw, to the fact that in quantum physics this description unavoidably disregards the specificity and locality of the states of consciousness. Now he is off into the usual subject-object confusion. The reason that no description coincides with reality is that the "reality" he refers to is just another description. It is just one intellectualization combating another intellectualization. Thus it seems that the least unsatisfactory image we can form of reality is one in which physical (i.e., empirical) reality and consciousness are not, as yet, differentiated. This is, therefore, what we suggest. Here he arrives bizarrely, from false premises, at an MOQ conclusion.

"Proposition (vi). According to this standpoint, consciousness and physical (or —empirical—) reality should be considered as two complementary aspects of reality. That is, "mind and matter, inorganic-biological, and social-intellectual." Agreed Their complementarity consists in the fact that each of them contributes decisively to a greater characterization and to a greater specification of the other one. Agreed

"Considered as a model, the relativity of state theory can help to visualize this to some extent. In it, the relative state plays the role of empirical reality; and this relative state is determined by the state of the corresponding observer, just as it also influences observers. Although at the present time there would be too great an amount of arbitrariness in accepting the relativity of state theory at its face value for a description of reality, the views it suggests of the relationships between empirical reality and observer can be thought of without contradiction as being substantially correct.

"Proposition (vii). Neither space nor time nor even space-time has a primitive existence. Right. They are not parts of reality as the latter concept is defined in proposition (~ii). They belong to —empirical— reality, intellectual patterns of static reality that is, they are modes of our sensibility. Agreed

"Proposition (viii). In the present description, a fact that has been considered by many thinkers as an extremely puzzling one appears as rather natural. This is simply the circumstance that —empirical— inorganic reality — the world — can be understood by our minds or, in other words, is amenable to a mathematical description. To the extent that our minds and —empirical— inorganic reality are complementary sides of one and the same reality, it does not appear as highly surprising that the general structures of this inorganic reality should, on the one hand, be reflected in the mathematics we build up and, on the other hand, manifest themselves in —empirical— inorganic reality.*

"Of course, the view that the physical descriptions we make bear directly, not on dynamic reality, but on —empirical— static reality does not invalidate proposition (iv) that our increasing knowledge of the physical laws truly bears on —real— static structures. As already stressed, this is due to the fact that this knowledge is concerned only with general, not specific, attributes. Thus reality and knowledge of it bear to one another more or less the same relationship that Russell exemplified by means of the relationship between a concert and its registered record. Now he is back into subject object metaphysics. The abstract structures are the same, although their supports are altogether different. Indeed, the plausibility of the assumption that our scientific laws are steadily approaching those of inorganic reality itself is, of course, increased by the observation made above [proposition (viii)] that we can understand the world.

"*The present suggestion differs from Bohr's generalized complementarity. The latter author never considered a fundamental reality possessing knowable structures. Yes I think this was Bohr's error. If it is denied that subjects and objects exist within a larger structure, then their relationship to each other seems impossible to resolve. {In d'Espagnat's original text, this appears as a footnote at page 291 bottom.}

"We think that the great majority of scientists have an immediate intuition of the fact that the inorganic reality in which they are interested, although it is known through experience, is not created by experience..." Ultimately it is created by experience, but experience shows that when one postulates that an independent inorganic reality exists one comes up with a higher quality of intellectual explanation than when one does not. Thus it really is ongoing Dynamic Quality that certifies our scientific explanation of things, not the inorganic world.

Best regards,

Robert
M Pirsig

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		Robert M. Pirsig Box FlameProof City, State, ZIP-zip U.S.A. August 18, 1999

	{Renselle comments in braces. Pirsig comments are in red. Pirsig —scratchouts— look like this. Added quotemarks to Pirsig's quotes of d'Espagnat's, *Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics*, pages 290-2. I.e., quoted black text is d'Espagnat.}


Dear Doug Renselle,

Thank you for your letter. I took out the book you recommended and find it pleasant to see the gulf between physics and philosophy fade in it with physics approaching the "natural philosophy" it once was. d'Espagnat seems to be moving toward a scientifically orthodox union of Quantum Theory with the MOQ although he does not reach that union or suggest anywhere that value might be the central reality he talks about.
Here are some points of agreement and difference with the propositions he sets forth on page 290:
"Proposition (i). The verb "to exist" has a meaning, irrespective of the difficulty we usually encounter in ascertaining whether or not a given concept qualifies as one of its possible subjects. Agreed
"Proposition (ii). Reality — defined as the totality of what exists — is essentially independent of us in its behavior. In other words, though we are parts of it, we are definitely not its regulators, in any sense. Agreed
"Proposition (iii). What we presently know is not in contradiction with the hypothesis that this reality has fundamental laws [they are, of course, independent of us as a consequence of proposition (ii)] Some of this reality, static reality, has fundamental laws. Dynamic reality does not. Inorganic and biological patterns of reality are independent of us ("us" being patterns of society and intellect) but society and intellect are not. {d'Espagnat's brackets}
"Proposition (iv). What we know is also not in contradiction with the assumption that we can reach an increasingly good knowledge of the *general* *structure* of these laws. Indeed, this assumption is free from contradictions stemming from the measurement theory, since the difficulties of this theory bear on *individual, not on general*, attributes. Moreover, it accounts in a rather natural way for the regularities we observe. There is thus no ground for discarding it. Agreed
"Proposition (v). What we presently know does contradict, however, the assumption that reality as defined above coincides in every respect with *empirical reality. In the MOQ Dynamic Quality is the fundamental empirical reality. By "empirical reality" we mean here a description* How can empirical reality be a description? This seems to me to be a blunder. The positivists must have him confused which is made in terms of particles, fields, classical physical objects, and so on, and in which individual attributes appear. In the last resort the circumstance that no such description coincides with reality is due, as we saw, to the fact that in quantum physics this description unavoidably disregards the specificity and locality of the states of consciousness. Now he is off into the usual subject-object confusion. The reason that no description coincides with reality is that the "reality" he refers to is just another description. It is just one intellectualization combating another intellectualization. Thus it seems that the least unsatisfactory image we can form of reality is one in which physical (i.e., empirical) reality and consciousness are not, as yet, differentiated. This is, therefore, what we suggest. Here he arrives bizarrely, from false premises, at an MOQ conclusion.
"Proposition (vi). According to this standpoint, consciousness and physical (or —empirical—) reality should be considered as two complementary aspects of reality. That is, "mind and matter, inorganic-biological, and social-intellectual." Agreed Their complementarity consists in the fact that each of them contributes decisively to a greater characterization and to a greater specification of the other one. Agreed
"Considered as a model, the relativity of state theory can help to visualize this to some extent. In it, the relative state plays the role of empirical reality; and this relative state is determined by the state of the corresponding observer, just as it also influences observers. Although at the present time there would be too great an amount of arbitrariness in accepting the relativity of state theory at its face value for a description of reality, the views it suggests of the relationships between empirical reality and observer can be thought of without contradiction as being substantially correct.
"Proposition (vii). Neither space nor time nor even space-time has a primitive existence. Right. They are not parts of reality as the latter concept is defined in proposition (~ii). They belong to —empirical— reality, intellectual patterns of static reality that is, they are modes of our sensibility. Agreed
"Proposition (viii). In the present description, a fact that has been considered by many thinkers as an extremely puzzling one appears as rather natural. This is simply the circumstance that —*empirical— inorganic reality* — *the world* — *can be understood by our minds or, in other words, is amenable to a mathematical description. To the extent that our minds and —empirical— inorganic reality are complementary sides of one and the same reality, it does not appear as highly surprising that the general structures of this inorganic reality should, on the one hand, be reflected in the mathematics we build up and, on the other hand, manifest themselves in —empirical— inorganic reality.
"Of course, the view that the physical descriptions we make bear directly, not on dynamic reality, but on —empirical— static reality does not invalidate proposition (iv) that our increasing knowledge of the physical laws truly bears on —*real— static* *structures*. As already stressed, this is due to the fact that this knowledge is concerned only with general, not specific, attributes. Thus reality and knowledge of it bear to one another more or less the same relationship that Russell exemplified by means of the relationship between a concert and its registered record. Now he is back into subject object metaphysics. The abstract structures are the same, although their supports are altogether different. Indeed, the plausibility of the assumption that our scientific laws are steadily approaching those of inorganic reality itself is, of course, increased by the observation made above [proposition (viii)] that we can understand the world.
"*The present suggestion differs from Bohr's generalized complementarity. The latter author never considered a fundamental reality possessing knowable structures. Yes I think this was Bohr's error. If it is denied that subjects and objects exist within a larger structure, then their relationship to each other seems impossible to resolve. {In d'Espagnat's original text, this appears as a footnote at page 291 bottom.}
"We think that the great majority of scientists have an immediate intuition of the fact that the inorganic reality in which they are interested, although it is *known* through experience, is not *created* by experience..." Ultimately it is created by experience, but experience shows that when one postulates that an independent inorganic reality exists one comes up with a higher quality of intellectual explanation than when one does not. Thus it really is ongoing Dynamic Quality that certifies our scientific explanation of things, not the inorganic world.

	Best regards,
	Robert	M Pirsig