(Most quotes verbatim William James, some paraphrased.)
(Relevant to Pirsig, William James Sidis, and Quantonics Thinking Modes.)
|"If reality changes by finite sensible steps, the question whether the bits of it that come are radically new, remains unsettled still. Remember our situation at the end of Chapter III. Being überhaupt or at large, we there found to be undeduceable. For our intellect it remains a casual and contingent quantum that is simply found or begged. May it be begged bit by bit, as it adds itself? Or must we beg it only once, by assuming it either to be eternal or to have come in an instant that co-implicated all the rest of time? Did or did not 'the first morning of creation write what the last dawn of reckoning shall read?' With these questions monism and pluralism stand face to face again. The classic obstacle to pluralism has always been what is known as the 'principle of causality.'"||
(Our bold emphasis.)
Classicists assume Newtonian objects may be described fully as y=f(t). I.e., object 'y' is a function of time, 't.'
They further assume 't' is homogeneous. I.e., they assume reality has one time (All classical reality marches to this classical drummer!) and it is an infinitely divisible whole (monist) continuum which is both differentiable and integrable.
That last paragraph describes what we mean when we say classicists depend upon analyticity for their objective reasoning.
Given their assumption of analyticity, classicists can say, "A causes B." Thus classical unilogical and homogeneous time becomes classicists' view of change. Classical change is object 'y's' motion as an analytic function of time. Motion is change, to a classicist.
Thus from a classical perspective, prior events leading to a change 'now,' are laid out for retrospective observation as a perfect continuum, and what happens next depends on that single, perfect, homogeneous history. Thus they can say, given those analytic assumptions, "A causes B."
Pluralists, like James, Bergson, Pirsig, et al., deny classical analyticity and time's singular, unilogical, homogeneity. Instead, they claim time is heterogeneous and discontinuous/quantal. They say that unitemporal, analytic motion is only one of unlimited kinds of change. They say that some changes are atemporal. (We teach you a great example here in Quantonics: superluminal action at a distance, gravity being one of its most obvious and classically observable 'tells.') They say that not just one homogeneous-time-continuum's-single-retrospective effects 'the' next outcome, but many both temporal and atemporal retrospectives affect next outcomes. Taken as omnimensional, omnicontextual, omniadic, etc. aggregates, these many retrospectives are stochastic, not analytic.
Pirsig, in his SODV paper, concludes Value is stochastic.
To restate Pirsig's "B values precondition(s) A," given our comparative selection of words, we might say, "B values both temporal and atemporal retrospective(s) A."
Pluralists say, "Many stochastic preconditions affect probabilistic outcomes." Distilled: many retrospectives affect next outcomes.
In Quantonics, we think classicists' views are naïve, and we think pluralists' views are 'better.' See if you agree. 28Apr2000 Doug.
"This principle has been taken to mean that the effect in some way already exists in the cause. If this be so, the effect cannot be absolutely novel, and in no radical sense can pluralism be true.
"We must therefore review the facts of causation. I take them in conceptual translation before considering them in perceptual form. The first definite inquiry into causes was made by Aristotle.
"The 'why' of anything, he said, is furnished by four principles: the material cause of it (as when bronze makes a statue); the formal cause (as when the ratio of two to one makes an octave); the efficient cause (as when a father makes a child) and the final cause (as when one exercises for the sake of health). Christian philosophy adopted the four causes; but what one generally means by the cause of anything is its 'efficient' cause, and in what immediately follows I shall speak of that alone."
(Our bold and color emphasis.)
Altered misguiding singulars to plurals. Changes in bold dark red. Doug - 19Mar2001.
"An efficient cause is scholastically defined as 'that
which produces something else by a real activity proceeding from
itself.' This is unquestionably the view of common
sense; and scholasticism is only common sense grown quite
articulate. Passing over the many classes of efficient cause
which scholastic philosophy specifies, I will enumerate three
important sub-principles it is sup-
"1. No effect can come into
being without a cause. This may be verbally taken;
"2. The effect is always proportionate
to the cause, and the cause to the effect.
(Our bold emphasis.)
2. Our quantum version: Outcomes are always stochastic based upon stochastic retrospective affects.
3. Our quantum version: Outcomes have stochastic, complementary interrelationships with both affects and their complements.
Note that our quantum outcomes have free will. They choose/decide/select what they incrementally become based on value preconditions!
"('Formally' here means that the cause resembles the effect, as when one motion causes another motion; virtually means that the cause somehow involves that effect, without resembling it, as when an artist causes a statue but possesses not himself its beauty; 'eminently' means that the cause, though unlike the effect, is superior to it in perfection, as when a man overcomes a lion's strength by greater cunning.)
"Nemo dat quod non habet is the real principle from which the causal philosophy flows; and the proposition causa æquat effectum practically sums up the whole of it. [see James' footnote 1 below]
"It is plain that each moment of the universe must contain all the causes of which the next moment contains effects, or to put it with extreme concision, it is plain that each moment in its totality causes the next moment. [see James' footnote 2 below]
[James' note 1:] "Read for a concise statement of the school-doctrine of causation the account in J. Rickaby: General Metaphysics, book 2, chap. iii. I omit from my text various subordinate maxims which have played a great part in causal philosophy, as 'The cause of a cause is the cause of its effects;' 'The same causes produce the same effects;' 'Causes act only when present;' 'A cause must exist before it can act,' etc.
[James' note 2:] "This notion follows also from the consideration of conditioning circumstances being at bottom as indispensable as causes for producing effects. 'The cause, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions positive and negative,' says J. S. Mill (Logic, 8th edition, i, 383). This is equivalent to the entire state of the universe at the moment that precedes the effect. But neither is the 'effect' in that case the one fragmentary event which our attention first abstracted under that name. It is that fragment, along with all its concomitants or in other words it is the entire state of the universe at the second moment desired."
Consider how completely at odds with modern quantum science this legacy classical perspective is. Quantum reality has countless Planck rate 'moments' occurring in an asynchronous and parallel manner. Each of those 'many' moments has an ensemble of quantum affective preconditions or current Values which are qualitatively (omniadically, omnivalently) assessed at any particular Planck Event to choose (not dyadically and bivalently determine inductively) any next Planck moment's outcomes. (12Mar2001 - Doug.)
Original Greek for 'heresy' is 'choice.' We may now be able to see why fundamental monists see quantum outcome 'free will' as "heresy." Fascinating!
This note implies to us that both James and Mill adhere classical, homogeneous time. They appear not yet to intuit quantum heterogeneous time and many quantum contexts.
Events are seen, strangely, as singular, not plural. Hmmm...
"But if the maxim holds firm that quidquid est in effectu debet esse prius aliquo modo in causa, it follows that the next moment can contain nothing genuinely original, and that the novelty that appears to leak into our lives so unremittingly, must be an illusion, ascribable to the shallowness of the perceptual point of view.
"Scholasticism always respected common sense, and in this case escaped the frank denial of all genuine novelty by the vague qualification 'aliquo modo.' This allowed the effect also to differ, aliquo modo, from its cause. But conceptual necessities have ruled the situation and have ended, as usual, by driving nature and perception to the wall. A cause and its effect are two numerically discrete concepts, and yet in some inscrutable way the former must 'Produce' the latter. How can it intelligibly do so, save by already hiding the latter in itself?"
|James belies classical reason's
cause and effect.
To those in cave common sense says, "There is no light."
By admitting a complementary, quantum, included-middle which classical formalism denies.
"Numerically two, cause and effect must be generically one, in spite of the perceptual appearances; and causation changes thus from a concretely experienced relation between differents into one between similars abstractly thought of as more real. [see James' footnote 1 below]
"The overthrow of perception by conception took a long time to complete itself in this field. The first step was the theory of 'occasionalism,' to which Descartes led the way by his doctrine that mental and physical substance, the one consisting purely of thought, the other purely of extension, were absolutely dissimilar. If this were so, any such causal intercourse as we instinctively perceive between mind and body ceased to be rational.
[James' footnote 1:] Sir William Hamilton expresses this very compactly: 'What is the law of Causality? Simply this, that when an object is presented phenomenally as commencing, we cannot but suppose that the complement (i. e. the amount) of existence, which it now contains, has previously been; in other words, that all that we at present know as an effect must previously have existed in its causes; though what these causes are we may perhaps be altogether unable to surmise.' (End of Lecture 39 of the Metaphysics.) The cause becomes a reason, the effect a consequence; and since logical consequence follows only from the same to the same, the older vaguer causation-philosophy develops into the sharp rationalistic dogma that cause and effect are two names for one persistent being, and that if the successive moments of the universe be causally connected, no genuine novelty leaks in."
|(Our bold emphasis.)
A classical imposition of homogeneity on cause/reason and effect/consequence...
...thus denying any potential for pluralism.
"For thinkers of that age, 'God' was the great solvent of absurdities. He could get over every contradiction. Consequently Descartes' disciples Régis and Cordemoy, and especially Geulinex, denied the fact of psychological interaction altogether. God, according to them, immediately caused the changes in our mind of which events in our body, and those in our body of which events in our mind, appear to be the causes, but of which they are in reality only the signals or occasions.
"Leibnitz took the next step forward in quenching the claim to truth of our perceptions. He freed God from the duty of lending all this hourly assistance, by supposing Him to have decreed on the day of creation that the changes in our several minds should coincide with those in our several bodies, after the manner in which clocks, wound up on the same day, thereafter keep time with one another. With this 'pre-established harmony' so-called, the conceptual translation of the immediate given, with its never failing result of negating both activity and continuity, is complete."
|(Our bold emphasis.)|
"Instead of the dramatic flux of personal life, a bare 'one to one correspondence' between the terms of two causally unconnected series is set up. God is the sole cause of anything, and the cause of everything at once. The theory is as monistic as the rationalist heart can desire, and of course novelty would be impossible if it were true.
"David Hume made the next step in discrediting common-sense causation. In the chapters on 'the idea of necessary connection' both in his 'Treatise on Human Nature,' and in his 'Essays,' he sought for a positive picture of the 'efficacy of the power' which causes are assumed to exert, and failed to find it. He shows that neither in the physical nor in the mental world can we abstract or isolate the 'energy' transmitted from causes to effects. This is as true of perception as it is of imagination. 'All ideas are derived from and represent impressions. We never have any impression that contains any power or efficacy. We never therefore have any idea of power.'"
|(Our bold emphasis.)
This sentence is interesting for its kinship to Pirsig's insistence that we can experience DQ, but not define it. Where Hume dichotomizes 'mental' and 'physical,' Pirsig unifies them as one class of Static Patterns of Value (SQ). It took us much work to extract inference that Pirsig sees both DQ and SQ as commingling and compenetrating one another.
"'We never can by our utmost scrutiny discover anything but one event following another; without being able to comprehend any force or power, by which the cause operates, or any connection between it and its supposed effect. . . . The necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connection or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or in common life.' 'Nothing is more evident than that the mind cannot form such an idea of two objects as to conceive any connection between them, or comprehend distinctly that power or efficacy by which they are united.'
"The pseudo-idea of a connection which we have, Hume then goes on to show, is nothing but the misinterpretation of a mental custom. When we have often experienced the same sequence of events, 'we are carried by habit, upon the appearance of the first one, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. . . . This customary transition of the imagination is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection."
|Continuing Hume's transitional view...
(Our bold emphasis.)
More agreement with Pirsig that knowledge or definition of DQ is denied sentient conception, but both Pirsig and James might say it is not denied, at least partially, our perception. (We surmise Hume uses 'idea' Platonically.)
And here, Hume belies a classical illusion of induction which is a close cousin to cause and effect.
"Nothing farther is in the case.' 'A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it that the idea of the one determines the idea of the other.' Nothing could be more essentially pluralistic than the elements of Hume's philosophy. He makes events rattle against their neighbors as drily as if they were dice in a box. He might with perfect consistency have believed in real novelties, and upheld freewill. But I said awhile ago that most empiricists had been halfhearted; and Hume was perhaps the most half-hearted of the lot. In his essay 'on liberty and necessity,' he insists that the sequences which we experience, though between events absolutely disconnected, are yet absolutely uniform, and that nothing genuinely new can flower out of our lives.
"The reader will recognize in Hume's famous pages a fresh example of the way in which conceptual translations always maltreat fact. Perceptually or concretely (as we shall notice in more detail later) causation names the manner in which some fields of consciousness introduce other fields."
|(Our bold and color emphasis.)
Hume says a cause is a (value) precondition.
Hume reverts to classical analyticity.
Hume's inconsistency (or our and James' inconsistency in interpreting him).
|199||"It is but one of the forms in which experience appears as a continuous flow. Our names show how successfully we can discriminate within the flow. But the conceptualist rule is to suppose that where there is a separate name there ought to be a fact as separate; and Hume, following this .rule, and finding no such fact corresponding to the word 'power,' concludes that the word is meaningless. By this rule every conjunction and preposition in human speech is meaningless in, on, of, with, but, and, if, are as meaningless as for, and because. The truth is that neither the elements of fact nor the meanings of our words are separable as the words are. The original form in which fact comes is the perceptual durcheinander, holding terms as well as relations in solution, or interfused and cemented. Our reflective mind abstracts divers[e] aspects in the muchness, as a man by looking through a tube may limit his attention to one part after another of a landscape. But abstraction is not insulation; and it no more breaks reality than the tube breaks the landscape."||
(Our bold and color emphasis. Our corrective brackets.
Quantumesque lingo here...
Read this last sentence again...again...again...
"Concepts are notes, views taken on reality, [see James footnote 1 below] not pieces of it, as bricks are of a house. Causal activity, in short, may play its part in growing fact, even though no substantive 'impression' of it should stand out by itself. Hume's assumption that any factor of reality must be separable, leads to his preposterous view, that no relation can be real. 'All events,' he writes, 'seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another, but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected.' Nothing, in short, belongs with anything else. Thus does the intellectualist method pulverize perception and triumph over life. Kant and his successors all espoused Hume's opinion that the immediately given is a disconnected 'manifold.' But unwilling simply to accept the manifold, as Hume did, they invoked a superior agent in the shape of what Kant called the 'transcendental ego of apperception' to patch its bits together by synthetic 'categories.' Among these categories Kant inscribes that of 'causality,' and in many quarters he passes for a repairer of the havoc that Hume made
[James' note 1:] These expressions are Bergson's."
|(Our bracketed footnote annotations.
Our bold emphasis.)
This is same intellectual 'violence' Mae-wan Ho speaks of in her, the Rainbow and the Worm, and exemplifies via biologists' cuisinarts and 100kg centrifuges. SOM's Iliadic wrath vents in many ways.
"His chapter on Cause [see James' footnote 1 below] is the most confusedly written part of his famous Critique, and its meaning is often hard to catch. As I understand his text, he leaves things just where Hume did, save that where Hume says 'habit' he says 'rule.' They both cancel the notion that phenomena called causal ever exert 'power,' or that a single case would ever have suggested cause and effect. In other words Kant contradicts common sense as much as Hume does and, like Hume, translates causation into mere time-succession; only, whereas the order in time was essentially 'loose' for Hume and only subjectively uniform, Kant calls its uniformity 'objective as obtaining in conformity to a law, which our Sinnlichkeit receives from our Verstand.' Non-causal sequences can be reversed; causal ones follow in conformity to rule. [see James' footnote 2 below]
[James' footnote 1:] "Entitled 'The Second Analogy of Experience,' it begins on page 239 of the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason.
[James' footnote 2:] "Kant's whole notion of a 'rule' is inconstruable by me. What or whom does the rule bind? If it binds the phenomenon that follows (the 'effect') we fall back into the popular dynamic view, and any single case would exhibit causal action, even were there no other cases in the world. Or does it bind the observer of the single case? But his own sensations of sequence are what bind him. Be a sequence causal or non-causal, if it is sensible, he cannot turn it backwards as he can his ideas. Or does the rule bind future sequences and determine them to follow in the same order which the first sequence observed? Since it obviously does not do this when the observer judges wrongly that the first sequence is causal, all we can say is that it is a rule whereby his expectations of uniformity follow his causal judgments, be these latter true or false. But wherein would this differ from the Humean position? Kant, in short, flounders, and in no truthful sense can one keep repeating that he has 'refuted Hume.'"
(Our bracketed footnote annotations. Our bold emphasis.)
Our 'Coherence and Reversibility' Table shows our Quantonic heuristic for latched, mixed, and pure quantons. Interesting how it jibes with Kant's notion of reversibility. Reader may wish to apply these considerations to your review of William James Sidis' The Animate and the Inanimate, on his theory of reversibility. Our big question there, "Was Sidis a self-cloaked sophist, and did his own quantum sophism influence his intuitions of considerations like those in our table above?"
|202||"The word Verstand in Kant's account must not be taken as if the rule it is supposed to set to sensation made us understand things any better. It is a brute rule of sequence which reveals no 'tie.' The non-rationality of such a category' leaves it worthless for purposes of insight. It removes dynamic causation and substitutes no other explanation for the sequences found. It yields external descriptions only, and assimilates all cases to those where we discover no reason for the law ascertained."||
James discloses in no gentle way, Kant's overt objectivism
and his almost complete lack of sensibility in favor of an extreme,
as James calls it, "non-rationality."
James essentially tells us, "Dump these tiny-minded objectivists!" Now you may see why we labor so long and hard to help you out of SOM and its objectivism.
|203||"Our 'laws of nature' do indeed
in large part enumerate bare coexistences and successions. Yellowness
and malleability coexist in gold; redness succeeds on boiling
in lobsters; coagulation in eggs; and to him who asks for the
Why of these uniformities, science only replies: 'Not
yet'! Meanwhile the laws are potent for prediction, and many
writers on science tell us that this is all we can demand. To
explain, according to the way of thinking called positivistic,
is only to substitute wider or more familiar, for narrower or
less familiar laws, and the laws at their widest only express
uniformities empirically found. Why does the pump suck up water?
Because the air keeps pressing it into the tube. Why does the
air press in? Because the earth attracts it. Why does the earth
attract it? Because it. attracts everything
such attraction being in the end only a more universal sort of
fact. Laws, according to their view, only generalize facts, they
do not connect them in any intimate sense. [see James' footnote
[James' footnote 1:] "For expressions of this view the student may consult J. S. Mill's Logic, book 3, chap. xii; W. S. Jevons's Principles of Science, book 6; J. Venn's Empirical Logic, chap. xxi, and K. Pearson's Grammar of Science, chap. iii."
Here we see James has not yet tumbled to what Poincaré
saw. Color is not an objective property! It is an interrelationship
of quantum value between and commingling observer and observed.
We show this as
James makes many cogent points that Kant would have observer and piece of gold each as objects forever and wholly separate and isolate from one another!
They do not interrelate them in any quantum sense.
|204||"Against this purely inductive
way of treating causal sequences, a more deductive interpretation
has recently been urged. If the later member of a succession
could be deduced by logic from the earlier member,
in the particular sequence the 'tie' would be unmistakable. But logical ties carry us only from sames to sames; so this last phase of scientific method is at bottom only the scholastic principle of Causa equat effectum, brought into sharper focus and illustrated more concretely. It is thoroughly monistic in its aims, and if it could be worked out in detail it would turn the real world into the procession of an eternal identity, with the appearances, of which we are perceptually conscious, occurring as a sort of by-product to which no 'scientific' importance should be attached. In any case no real growth and no real novelty could effect an entrance into life."
|James shows us how pluralism and
its incremental evolution deduce what outcomes
happen next based upon plural
and value-pre-conditional retrospectives, as we described in
our comments at beginning
of this chapter. Mr. James, your work is superb! Doug.
(Our bold emphasis.)
Our emphases, here, are very important!
These words are Bergsonian!
If some of you fundamentalists think this denies God, we offer a condolence. Consider evolute pluralism as God's ascendant method, above that which monist objectivists formerly imposed.
|205||"This negation of real novelty seems to be the upshot of the conceptualist philosophy of causation. This is why I called it on page 189 the classic obstacle to the acceptance of pluralism's additive world. The principle of causality begins as a hybrid between common sense and intellectualism: what actively produces an effect, it says, must 'in someway' contain the 'power' of it already."||
James commences his summary of Chapter XII.
(Our bold emphasis.)
"But as nothing corresponding to the concept of power can be insulated, the activity-feature of the sequence erelong gets suppressed, and the vague latency, supposed to exist aliquo modo in the causal phenomenon, of the effect about to be produced, is developed into a static relation of identity between two concepts which the mind substitutes for the percepts between which the causal tie originally was found.
"The resultant state of 'enlightened opinion' about cause, is, as I have called it before, confused and unsatisfactory. Few philosophers hold radically to the identity view. The view of the logicians of science is easier to believe but not easier to believe metaphysically, for it violates instinct almost as strongly."
|James affirms our previous statement!
(Our bold and color emphasis.)
'Identity' depends upon SOM's wall, its Aristotelian excluded-middle for objective, logical 'existence.'
Quantonics' own quantons are James' concepts and percepts commingling as quantons: quanton(percepts,concepts).
As we say, repeatedly, classical science and mathematics are in deep trouble. They are incapable, innately, of coping with Millennium III's tsunami of quantum change. This is one of most severe and challenging Millennium III problems!
|207||"Mathematicians make use, to connect the various interdependencies of quantities, of the general concept of function. That A is a function of B (A equals B) means that with every alteration in the value of A, an alteration in that of B is always connected. If we generalize so as also to include qualitative dependencies, we can conceive the universe as consisting of nothing but elements with functional relations between them; and science has then for its sole task the listing of the elements and the describing in the simplest possible terms the functional 'relations.' Changes, in short, occur, and ring throughout phenomena, but neither reasons, nor activities in the sense of agencies, have any place in this world of scientific logic, which compared with the world of common sense, is so abstract as to be quite spectral, and merits the appellation (so often quoted from Mr. Bradley) of 'an unearthly ballet of bloodless categories.'||Here James explains a need for our
use of our new Quantonic font 'equals.' It notationally addresses
his concern, thus: (Our bold emphasis.)
We would say, "...consisting of both vacuum energy (iso)flux and quantons (patterns of value) with quantonic interrelationships among them..." As to listing them, QTMs teach us there are unlimited varieties of quantons, and unlimited possibilities for new ones.
Great chapter, Mr. James! Doug 29Apr2000.