Chapter:

Translator's
Preface

61

"Fechner took as his starting-point a law discovered by Weber, according to which, given a

Fechner's psychophysics. Weber's Law.

certain stimulus which calls forth a certain sensation, the amount by which the stimulus must be

increased for consciousness to become aware of any change bears a fixed relation to the original stimulus. Thus, if we denote by E the stimulus which corresponds to the sensation S, and by E the amount by which the original stimulus must be increased in order that a sensation of difference may be produced, we shall have E/E=const. This [Weber's] formula has been much modified by the disciples of Fechner, and we prefer to take no part in the discussion; it is for experiment to decide between the relation established by Weber and its substitutes. Nor shall we raise any difficulty about granting the probable existence of a law of this nature. It is here really a question not of measuring a sensation but only of determining the exact moment at which an increase of stimulus produces a change in it. Now, if a definite amount of stimulus produces a definite shade of sensation, it is obvious that the minimum amount of stimulus required to produce a change in this shade is also definite; and since it is not constant, it must be a function of the original stimulus. But how are we to pass from a relation between the stimulus and its minimum increase to an equation which connects the "amount of sensation" with the corresponding stimulus? The whole of psychophysics is involved in this transition, which is therefore worthy of our closest consideration.

"We shall distinguish several different artifices

The underlying assumptions and the process by which Fechner's Law is reached.

in the process of transition from Weber's experiments, or from any other series of similar observations, to a psychophysical law like Fechner's."

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Bergson restarts his footnote counts on each page. So to refer a footnote, one must state page number and footnote number.

Our bold and color highlights follow a code:

• black-bold - important to read if you are just scanning our review
• orange-bold - text ref'd by index pages
• green-bold - we see Bergson suggesting axiomatic memes
• violet-bold - an apparent classical problematic
• blue-bold - we disagree with this text segment while disregarding context of Bergson's overall text
• gray-bold - quotable text
• red-bold - our direct commentary

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"It is first of all agreed to consider our consciousness of an increase of stimulus as an increase of the sensation S: this is therefore called S. It is then asserted that all the sensations S, which correspond to the smallest perceptible increase of stimulus, are equal to one another. They are therefore treated as quantities, and while, on the one hand, these quantities are supposed to be always equal, and, on the other, experiment has given a certain relation E = f (E) between the stimulus E and its minimum increase, the constancy of S is expressed by writing S= C*(”E / f (E)), C being a constant quantity. Finally it is agreed to replace the very small differences S and E by the infinitely small differences dS and dE, whence an equation which is, this time, a differential one: dS= C*(dE / f (E)). We shall now simply have to integrate on both sides to obtain the desired relation ⁽¹⁾: S= C*Integral, from-zero-to-pi, of C*(dE/f(E)). And the transition will thus be made from a proved law, which only concerned the occurrence of a sensation, to an unprovable law which gives its measure."

Note (1): In the particular case where we admit without restriction Weber's Law E/E=const., integration gives S=C*log(E/Q), Q being a constant. This is Fechner's "logarithmic law."

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Reader, please comsider classical equal sign vis-à-vis Quantonics equal sign. Also, comsider a concept of classical division. Does it n¤t require absolutely state-ic stimulus and response/sensation? How does one make reality hold still so that one may divide two static concepts?

This is called 'science.' Science is stopping nature! Pirsig tells us this is what he dislikes most about classical thing-king. CTMs are always trying to trap nature in CTM-staticity.

Classical versions of quantum 'science' do something similar by trying to trap nature's animacy in Eigenstates whose values are either zero or one. Ughly!

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"Without entering upon any thorough discussion of this ingenious operation, let us show in a few words how Fechner has grasped the real difficulty of the problem, how he has tried to overcome it, and where, as it seems to us, the flaw in his reasoning lies.

"Fechner realized that measurement could not be introduced into

Can two sensations be equal without being identical?

psychology without first defining what is meant by the equality and addition of two simple states, e.g. two sensations. But, unless they are identical, we do not at first

see how two sensations can be equal. Undoubtedly in the physical world equality is not synonymous with identity. But the reason is that every phenomenon, every object, is there presented under two aspects, the one qualitative and the other extensive: nothing prevents us from putting the first one aside, and then there remains nothing but terms which can be directly or indirectly [classically] superposed on one another and consequently seen to be identical. Now, this qualitative element, which we begin by eliminating from external objects in order to measure them, is the very thing which psychophysics retains and claims to measure. And it is no use trying to measure this quality Q by some physical quantity Q' which lies beneath it: for it would be necessary to have previously shown that Q is a function of Q', and this would not be possible unless the quality Q had first been measured with some fraction of itself."

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CTMs treat those two aspects as exclusive. They use SOM's knife to sever quality from extensity and throw former away, thus simplifying their classical view of reality! Quantonics teaches its students that those two aspects may n¤t be severed, indeed, they are n¤nseverable. Why? Their middles are quantum-included! They are:

• quantons(quality,extensity), n¤t
• dichons(quality, extensity).

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"Thus nothing prevents us from measuring the sensation of heat by the degree of temperature; but this is only a convention, and the whole point of psychophysics lies in rejecting this convention and seeking how the sensation of heat varies when you change the temperature. In a word, it seems, on the one hand. that two different sensations cannot be said to be equal unless some identical residuum remains after the elimination of their qualitative difference; but, on the other hand, this qualitative difference being all that we perceive, it does not appear what could remain once it was eliminated.

"The novel feature in Fechner's treatment is that he did not consider

Fechner's method of minimum differences.

this difficulty insurmountable. Taking advantage of the fact that sensation varies by sudden jumps while the stimulus increases continuously, he did not hesitate

to call these differences of sensation by the same name: they are all, he says, minimum differences, since each corresponds to the smallest perceptible increase in the external stimulus. Therefore you can set aside the specific shade or quality of these successive differences; a common residuum will remain in virtue of which they will be seen to be in a manner identical: they all have the common character of being minima. Such will be the definition of equality which we were seeking. Now, the definition of addition will follow naturally." [Compare Bergson's use of minima to classical mathematics' Peano induction modulus of 'one.' Then compare it to our Planck Quanton. Note how we deny any assumption of equality or identity among Planck quanta. First, they are unstoppable, second, they are all stochastic n¤nlocalable flux, third, they included-middle c¤mplement one another via quantum vacuum flux.]

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When one first sees classical 'science' in this n¤vel Bergsonian light, one realizes, genuinely, how silly classical 'science' is. Classical science "sets aside" reality's most valuable and beautiful and miraculous aspects — for its own convenience! Worse, in essence, it lies! That discipline which claims to seek 'the' truth, chooses instead to lie. And today, in 2002, it continues to repeat this outrage, over and over and over... And academe 'teaches' its students how to maintain this relentless lie. And we pay them for status quo as mind-cloned role-players of Static Quality.

This is why we see, following David Bohm's "n¤nMechanics of Quanta" lead, Quantonics and its pursuit of a n¤vel quantum ~n¤nscience as such an important endeavor. Doug - 26Feb2002.

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"For if we treat as a quantity the difference perceived by consciousness between two sensations which succeed one another in the course of a continuous increase of stimulus, if we call the first sensation S, and the second S+S, we shall have to consider every sensation S as a sum, obtained by the addition of the minimum differences through which we pass before reaching it. The only remaining step will then be to utilize this twofold definition in order to establish, first of all, a relation between the differences S and E, and then, through the substitution of the differentials, between the two variables. True, the mathematicians may here lodge a protest against the substitution of differential for difference; the psychologists may ask, too, whether the quantity S, instead of being constant, does not vary as the sensation S itself; ⁽¹⁾ finally, taking the psychophysical law for granted, we may all debate about its real meaning. But, by the mere fact that S is regarded as a quantity and S as a sum, the fundamental postulate of the whole process is accepted.

"Now it is just this postulate which seems to us

Break-down of the assumption that the sensation is a sum. and the minimum differences quantities.

open to question, even if it can be understood. Assume that I experience a sensation S, and that, increasing the stimulus continuously, I perceive this increase after a certain time. I am now notified of the increase of the cause: but why should I call this

notification an arithmetical difference?"

Note (1): Latterly it has been assumed that S is proportional to S.

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In quantum reality, we have to give up notions of sums and differences and replace them with animate notions of "valuing interrelationships." By valuing, we intend an animate, present participle, process analogue of static value. We also must give up any notion of isolating a particular sensation objectively as classicists assume we may.

A qubit offers a perfect example of what we mean here. A qubit is a quanton, and thus is a quantum valuing interrelationship. Its omnivalency uncloaks quantum reality's unlimited interrelationships with any qubit, or for that matter, any quanton. Any qubit has potentially all reality as its omnivalent complement. We may make an analogous statement for any quanton.

Any quanton emerqs via its inclusive c¤mplementary interrelationships. Human sensation, from a quantum perspective, might involve a vast number of quantons, each with their own vast, omnivalent c¤mplementary interrelationships.

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"No doubt the notification consists in the fact that the original state S has changed: it has become S'; but the transition from S to S' could only be called an arithmetical difference if I were conscious, so to speak, of an interval between S and S', and if my sensation were felt to rise from S to S' by the addition of something. By giving this transition a name, by calling it S, you make it first a [classical, static-latched] reality and then a quantity. Now, not only are you unable to explain in what sense this transition is a quantity, but reflection will show you that it is not even a reality; the only realities are the states S and S' through which I pass. No doubt, if S and S' were numbers, I could assert the reality of the difference S'—S even though S and S' alone were given; the reason is that the number S—S, which is a certain sum of units, will then represent just the successive moments of the addition by which we pass from S to S'. But if S and S' are simple states, in what will the interval which separates them consist? And what, then, can the transition from the first state to the second be, if not a mere act of your thought, which, arbitrarily and for the sake of the argument, assimilates a succession of two states to a differentiation of two magnitudes?

"Either you keep to what consciousness presents

We can speak of "arithmetical difference" only in a conventional sense.

to you or you have recourse to a conventional mode of representation. In the first case you will find a difference between S and S' like that between the shades of the

rainbow, and not at all an interval of magnitude."

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Yet, this is what classical 'science' declares 'reality' is!

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"In the second case you may introduce the symbol S if you like, but it is only in a conventional sense that you will speak here of an arithmetical difference, and in a conventional sense, also, that you will assimilate a sensation to a sum. The most acute of Fechner's critics, Jules Tannery, has made the latter point perfectly clear. 'It will be said, for example, that a sensation of 50 degrees is expressed by the number of differential sensations which would succeed one another from the point where sensation is absent up to the sensation of 50 degrees. . . . I do not see that this is anything but a definition, which is as legitimate as it is arbitrary.' ⁽¹⁾

"We do not believe, in spite of all that has been said, that the method of mean gradations has set psychophysics on a new path. The novel feature in

Delbœuf's results seem more plausible, but in the end, all psychophysics revolves in a vicious circle.

Delbœuf's investigation was that he chose a particular case, in which consciousness seemed to decide in Fechner's favour, and in which common sense itself

played the part of the psychophysicist. He inquired whether certain sensations did not appear to us immediately as equal although different, and whether it would not be possible to draw up, by their help, a table of sensations which were double, triple or quadruple those which preceded them."

Note (1): Revue scientifique, March 13 and April 24, 1875.

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See our August, 2001 QQA on cause-effect.

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69

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As students of Quantonics, all we need do is realize that sensations are quantons and as such they have animate and thus quantum uncertain:

• amplitude,
• frequency,
• phase,
• intensity,
• and unlimited other quantum uncertain numbers, and

that they are all quantum c¤mplementary one another to greater or lesser degrees. Then we can know how ludicrous and naïve classical perspectives of reality are. See our precedential page 45 comments.

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"In a word, all psychophysics is condemned by its origin to revolve in a vicious circle, for the theoretical postulate on which it rests condemns it to experimental verification, and it cannot be experimentally verified unless its postulate is first granted. The fact is that there is no point of contact between the unextended and the extended, between quality and quantity. We can interpret the one by the other, set up the one as the equivalent of the other; but sooner or later, at the beginning or at the end, we shall have to recognize the conventional character of this assimilation.

"In truth, psychophysics merely formulates with precision and

Psychophysics merely pushes to its extreme consequences the fundamental but natural mistake of regarding sensations as magnitudes.

pushes to its extreme consequences a conception familiar to common sense. As speech dominates over thought, as external objects, which are common to us all, are more important to us than the subjective states through which each of us passes, we have everything to gain by objectifying these states, by introducing into

them, to the largest possible extent, the representation of their external cause. And the more our knowledge increases, the more we perceive the extensive behind the intensive, quantity behind quality, the more also we tend to thrust the former into the latter, and to treat our sensations as magnitudes."

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Bergson is correct from a 'classical' view. If one views quantity and quality as a dichon, there is no join.

However, if one views them in quantum reality as a quanton, they become quantum c¤mplements of one another. Given that enormously difficult epiphany (were it easy, others would have seen it much earlier) we can say that, "Quality is in quantity and quantity is in Quality!" We show this as quanton(quality,quantity) vis-à-vis dichon(quality, quantity). In quantum logic they have a join which we call a "quantum c¤mplementary included-middle."

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Pure quality which is Bergson's pure instinct, his pure élan vital, may n¤t be measured n¤r confined directly. When portions of it are latched into actuality, its n¤nactual pureness remains: commingling, compenetrating as a quantum n¤nactual c¤mplement of its tentatively latched actual quantum c¤mplementary apparition. Our quanton semiotics show this heterogeneous, animate, included-middle both-all/while/and-many of both unlatched n¤nactualities' and latched actualities' quantum c¤mplements.

Note, reader, that quantum superposition is a quantum nonlocal phenomenon. Probability distribution of an electron in its atomic energy shell is quantum superposition. Coherent energy in a tsunami is quantum superposition. Just as said electron is "every where," so to is tsunami's wave energy "every where." Electron's loci are "superposed" everywhere. Electron's momenta are "superposed" everywhere. Now make a big leap and view your thoughts on your quantum stage as "superposed" everywhere!!! That is how SONs work!

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Reader, by now you may intuit how classical measurement is what we call "quantum naïve." Why? Any classical mindset using CTMs considers measurement uniparametric. CTMs noodle that classical properties may be conceptually measured discretely, unilaterally, and in ideal objective isolation. That is a naïve view.

Quantum 'numbers' or quantum qualitative artifacts of actuality (real quantons) coinside and coobsfect one another at up to Planck rates. Classicists use eigenfunctions and eigenvectors to 'project' subsets of these quantum artifacts, as a single measurement, at any chosen state-ic (stopped) time. This process exemplifies simply why we call classical measurement "naïve." Classical measurement has n¤ means of enveloping all quantum artifacts in a single measurement, n¤r has it any means of doing it in a heterogeneous, multitemporal quantum-animate fashion. By multitemporal we imply "many times."
Doug - 9Mar2001.

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