Chapter: |
I | II | ||||||||||||||||||||
Bibliography | Author's Preface |
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | ||||
Chapter: |
III | ||||||||||||||||||
18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | Conclusion | Index |
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(Most quotes verbatim Henri Louis Bergson, some paraphrased.) |
(Relevant to Pirsig, William James Sidis, and Quantonics Thinking Modes.) |
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"But determinism
will not admit itself
beaten, and, putting the question in a new form, it will say:
"Let
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(Our links, brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.) Bergson restarts his footnote counts on each page. So to refer a footnote, one must state page number and footnote number. Our bold and color highlights follow a code:
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184 |
"To say that a certain friend, under certain circumstances, will very probably act in a certain way, is not so much to predict the future conduct of our friend as to pass a judgment on his present character, that is to say, on his past. Although our feelings, our ideas, our character, are constantly altering, a sudden change is seldom observed; and it is still more seldom that we cannot say of a person whom we know that certain actions seem to accord fairly well with his nature and that certain others are absolutely inconsistent with it. All philosophers will agree on this point; for to say that a given action is consistent or inconsistent with the present character of a person whom one knows is not to bind the future to the present. But the determinist goes much further: he asserts that our solution is provisional simply because we never know all the conditions of the problem; that our forecast would gain in probability in proportion as we were provided with a larger number of these conditions; that, therefore, complete and perfect knowledge of all the antecedents without any exception would make our forecast infallibly true. Such, then, is the hypothesis which we have to examine. "For the sake of greater definiteness, let us imagine a person called upon to make a seemingly free
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(Our bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
Bergson wrote this prior Kurt Gödel's being. Gödel showed that "complete and perfect knowledge" is impossible in terms of classical representation of reality. He showed that n¤ classically real, formal system may be both complete (always states the truth...) and consistent (...and states all truths) simultaneously. For significantly more detail, see our Decidable Gödel Meme. Further, in quantum reality, there are n¤ classically hidden variables, unless one wishes to perceive animate ensemble quantum uncertainty as "hidden variables." From a quantum perspective a call to "hidden variables" is like a call to ideal, pre-existing, previously unknown Platonic concepts. If by hidden variables, one intends infinite precision analogue reality, then we can agree at least partially, but that appears n¤t to be what what Bergson refers as "unknown conditions." He appears to imply that classical determinists assert that previously undiscovered parameters exist which when discovered will permit them to refine their theories of classical determinism. Quantum reality, as currently interpreted, offers only ensemble determinism, i.e., statistical determinism which is by n¤ means a proxy for what classical determinists intend by 1-1 correspondent causal determinism. Classicism is innately (by anthropocentric design) incapable of knowing completely, for a very simple reason: it is analytic! Instead of actually performing progressive process actionings it stops action (Zeno effect). Classical science and its tools do n¤t work on animate, dynamic quantum reality. They only work on inanimate, static classical reality. As David Bohm said, (paraphrased) "We need a new quantum n¤n-mechanics (a new n¤n radically formal mechanics)." In Quantonics we call what Bohm seeks "quantum emerscence," which is indeed, "quantum computing." |
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185 | "There are several ways of picturing the mental condition of a person at a given moment. We try to do it when e.g. we read a novel; but whatever care the author may have taken in depicting the feelings of his hero, and even in tracing back his history, the end, foreseen or unforeseen, will add something to the idea which we had formed of the character: the character, therefore, was only imperfectly known to us. In truth, the deeper psychic states, those which are translated by free acts, express and sum up the whole of our past history: if Paul knows all the conditions under which Peter acts, we must suppose that no detail of Peter's life escapes him, and that his imagination reconstructs and even lives over again Peter's history. But we must here make a vital distinction. When I myself pass through a certain psychic state, I know exactly the intensity of this state and its importance in relation to the others, not by measurement or comparison, but because the intensity of e.g. a deep-seated feeling is nothing else than the feeling itself. On the other hand, if I try to give you an account of this psychic state, I shall be unable to make you realize its intensity except by some definite sign of a mathematical kind: I shall have to measure its importance, compare it with what goes before and what follows, in short determine the part which it plays in the final act." |
(Our bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
Here, apparently, Bergson experimentally prescribes a methodology of comparative communication twixt two humans. His purpose is to refute classical determinism, but it begs some tangential queries. Is this method unique? Is it only classical? Why does he say we must transform our psychic intensity into some mathematical measure in order to communicate it? Has he n¤t simply jumped back in SOM's number box? What about whistling, humming, singing, drumming, dancing, playing a musical instrument, painting, sculpting, carving, et al.? Isn't there an I-cubed analogue of music which we can use to side-step classical analytic symbolics (shades of Close Encounters of a Third Kind)? What do our examples offer vis-à-vis Bergson's proscription? Do our examples increase DQ while decreasing SQ? Is that a valid approach? What do we mean when we say "increase DQ?" How? What do we mean when we say "decrease SQ?" How? Why is Bergson's approach asking for more SQ (i.e., increased mathematical measurements) in order for us to share a psychic experience? Note: we are begging a quantum Bergsonian think-being-directly (~400k page), quanton emerscitecture, which Bergson himself suggests in his book, Creative Evolution. Why cann¤t we share our psychic intensity in a direct quantum c¤mplementary fashion without an intermediate mathematical measure? We believe we can! Correction! We k-now we can! "Qubits do it... Birds do it... Even little bees do it..." Our question then becomes, "How can we tentatively, quantum coherently, as two or more unique psychic quantum entities share any specific psychic experience directly, without going through some actual intermediate mathematical measurement transformation?" Has Bergson given into a kind of classical inevitability as have Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Newton, Bohr, Einstein, and so many others? Or is he just offering this approach as a gedankenment? If we can directly experience quantum nature, why cann¤t we directly experience another human's own psychic intensity? |
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186 | "And I shall say that it is more or less intense, more or less important, according as the final act is explained by it or apart from it. On the other hand, for my own consciousness, which perceived this inner state, there was no need of a comparison of this kind: the intensity was given to it as an inexpressible quality of the state itself. In other words, the intensity of a psychic state is not given to consciousness as a special sign accompanying this state and denoting its power, like an exponent in algebra; we have shown above that it expresses rather its shade, its characteristic colouring, and that, if it is a question of a feeling, for example, its intensity consists in being felt. Hence we have to distinguish two ways of assimilating the conscious states of other people: the one dynamic [Pirsigean DQ], which consists in experiencing them oneself; the other static [Pirsigean SQ], which consists in substituting for the consciousness of these states their image or rather their intellectual symbol, their idea. In this case the conscious states are imagined instead of being reproduced; but, then, to the image of the psychic states themselves some indication of their intensity should be added, since they no longer act on the person in whose mind they are pictured and the latter has no longer any chance of experiencing their force by actually feeling them." |
(Our links, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
N¤, Bergson was n¤t giving in to a kind of classical inevitability!
Showing its quantum included-middle qualitative subjectiveness...its quantum animate process realness.
We must question, here, Bergson's apparently classical use of reproduced. To us, reproduction is kin of classical manufacturing. To relive, or perhaps a better way to say this is, "to simulive" another's experiences, we need co-inside-nt vicarious emerscenturing (similar to a Spock mind-meld, and that damnable machine in Brain Waves, with Natalie Wood BTW, did that "damnable machine" have to be quantum everywhere associative to accomplish what it did?). Comsider that this is just what next generation quantum computers
will do to, animately, included-middle, quantum-measure animate
reality! Real quantum computing animate process n¤nanalyticity
(e.g., David Bohm's "...quantum n¤nmechanics of reality...")
will be qubitally
vicarious! But first, we must learn how to permit qubits
to have vicarious interrelationships with real quantons.
Comsider how
this is a query analogue of how qubits in quantum SONs
coobsfectively,
c¤mplementarily,
"everywhere associate." |
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187 | "Now, this indication itself will necessarily assume a quantitative character: it will be pointed out, for example, that a certain feeling has more strength than another feeling, that it is necessary to take more account of it, that it has played a greater part; and how could this be known unless the later history of the person were known in advance, with the precise actions in which this multiplicity of states or inclinations has issued? Therefore, if Paul is to have an adequate idea of Peter's state at any moment of his history, there are only two courses open; either, like a novelist who knows whither he is conducting his characters, Paul must [classically] already know Peter's final act, and must thus be able to supplement his mental image of the successive states through which Peter is going to pass by some indication of their value in relation to the whole of Peter's history; or he must [quantumly] make up his mind to pass through these different states, not in imagination, but in reality. The former hypothesis must be put on one side since the very point at issue is whether , the antecedents alone being given, Paul will be able to foresee the final act [classical determinism/causation axiomatically prescribes that he shall]. We find ourselves compelled, therefore, to alter radically the idea which we had formed of Paul: he is not, as we had thought at first, a spectator whose eyes pierce the future, but an actor who plays Peter's part in advance. And notice that you cannot exempt him from any detail of this part, for the most common-place [including most importantly, quantum qualitative, subjective] events have their importance in a life-story; and even supposing that they have not, you cannot decide that they are insignificant [classicism presumes that we must discard all quantum qualitative, subjective 'events'] except in relation to the final act, which, by hypothesis, is not given." |
(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.) Quantity implies, classically, a specific, measurable, numerable amount. However, we cann¤t, even though some classicists presume that we can, e-numerate intensity of feeling, intensity of emotion. What scale do we use? What units? Classicists will tell us to invent a scale and units and impose classical analytic measurement on quality. But Bergson has already warned us of that... |
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188 | "Neither have you the right to cut short [as classicists presume we must]were it only by a secondthe different states of consciousness through which Paul is going to pass before Peter; for the effects of the same feeling, for example, go on accumulating at every moment of duration, and the sum total of these effects could not be realized all at once unless one knew the importance of the feeling, taken in its totality, in relation to the final act, which is the very thing that is supposed to remain unknown. But if Peter and Paul have experienced the same feelings in the same order, if their minds have the same history, how will you distinguish one from the other? Will it be by the body in which they dwell? They would then always differ in some respect, viz., that at no moment of their history would they have a mental picture of the same body. Will it be by the place which they occupy in time? In that case they would no longer be present at the same events: now, by hypothesis, they have the same past and the same present, having the same experience. You must now make up your mind about it: Peter and Paul are one and the same person, whom you call Peter when he acts and Paul when you recapitulate his history. The more complete you made the sum of the conditions which, when known, would have enabled you to predict Peter's future action, the closer became your grasp of his existence and the nearer you came to living his life over again down to its smallest details: you thus reached the very moment when, the action taking place, there was no longer anything to be foreseen, but only something to be done." [Something being done, being experienced directly, quantum coherently, together: quantum computing.] |
(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
Classicist will say, "Just subtract B from A, dummy! A-B, Peter minus Paul is the absolutely right answer, you idiot!" Of course, 'no' denigration intended. |
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189 |
"Here again any attempt to reconstruct ideally an act really willed ends in the mere witnessing of the act whilst it is being performed or when it is already done. "Hence it is a question devoid of meaning to ask: Could or could not the act be foreseen, given the
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(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.) | ||||
190 | "By going deeper into this
twofold argument, we shall find, at its very root, the two fundamental illusions of the reflective
consciousness. The
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(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
1. Quality is n¤t classically mathematical.
2. Classical objective symbols cann¤t represent quality. But, reality is predominantly qualitative! |
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"Now, in
these two illusions themselves a third one is involved, and you
will see that the question whether the act could or could not be foreseen
always comes back to this: Is time space? You
begin by setting side by side in some
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(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
3. Time is n¤t space! Space is classically stoppable, and thus drawable/graphable in situ, state-ically. Time is unstoppable. Time has duration: it is process, and that is why Bergson tells us process is classically n¤nanalyzable! It is a mistake to claim space-time an identity. For over four years now, we in Quantonics have been showing our students that time and space (plus gravity, et al.) are both derivatives of absolute quantum flux. In our animate quantum world, space and time both have duration; both emerse at (up to) Planck rates. In that sense, we could say that they are analogous. But all quantum flux, n¤t just space and time are analogous via their absolute fluxings. Too, there is n¤t just one (OGC/OGT) unilogical space and one unilogical time, rather there are unlimited (at least) quatrotomous (in entropy, coherence, etc.) pragmalogical spaces and times and gravities and temperatures, and pressures, and colors, and rates, and smells, and sounds, and balances, and equilibria, etc., and all their quantum complements too. These are quantum reality's animate, included-middle, qualitative heterogeneities of qualogos. |
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192 |
"So you then alter your hypothesis; you realize that time does not require to be seen, but to be lived; and hence you conclude that, if your knowledge of the line M 0 was not a sufficient datum, the reason must have been that you looked at it from the outside instead of identifying yourself with the point M, which describes not only M 0 but also the whole curve, and thus making its movement your own. Therefore, you persuade Paul to come and coincide [also comsider "coinside"] with Peter; and naturally, then, it is the line M 0 X Y which Paul traces out in space, since, by hypothesis, Peter describes this line. But in no wise do you prove thus that Paul foresaw Peter's action; you only show that Peter acted in the way he did, since Paul became Peter. It is true that you then come back, unwittingly, to your former hypothesis, because you continually confuse the line M 0 X Y in its tracing [animate process] with the line M 0 X Y already traced [analyzable state-icity], that is to say, [con-fuse-ing] time with space. After causing Paul to come down and identify himself with Peter as long as was required, you let him go up again and resume his former post of observation. No wonder if he then perceives the line M 0 X Y complete: he himself has just been completing it. "What makes the confusion a natural and almost an unavoidable one is that [classical] science seems to
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(Our link, brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
A problematic: Bergson apparently dichotomizes, classically, either inside or outside. We noticed this elsewhere too. We think it is pretentious classicism.
It is of utmost importance for students of Quantonics to see here how our QTMs eliminate this classical con-fuse-ion. We do it by saying that quantum reality's only absolute is flux! Flux is crux! Quantum flux is absolute by being both comsistent (always changes) and c¤mplete (changes all). Quantum reality has n¤ classically ideal: state-icity, immutability, stability, etc. When we talk about Pirsig's Static Quality, we are speaking of decoherent quantum flux which has quantum variable/tentative persistence (QVP). Quantum variable/tentative persistence shows students of Quantonics that all quantum reality changes, heterogeneously, asynchronously, serially, and in parallel from imperceptibly slowly up to Planck's incredibly fast rate. Apples spoil. Paint peels. Galaxies are born, live and die. Biologicals emerge and cycle. Memes evolve. Compare our QTMs to what Plato (divine 'ideas' pre-exist, are immortal and immutable), Aristotle (his three "sillygisms;" Plato's and Aristotle's hatreds of (quantum) 'sophisms'), and Maxwell (e.g., 2nd 'law' of thermodynamics) said about classical reality. In Quantonics our comcepts of quantum variable/tentative persistence have many brethren, including:
Allow us to introduce some other n¤vel, supporting quantonics quantum variable/tentative persistence memes and their acronyms:
Our use of "Uncertainty" in our latter two memes assumes our unique Quantonics Ensemble Quantum Uncertainty, which further assumes Bergson's heterogeneous timings. Our use of "Apparent Certainty" implies apparent classical certainty. Very simply, then, as Ensemble Quantum C¤mplexity grows, CPN, FPN, IPAC, MTBUE, and PSIUE grow. Our intent here is to disclaim a classical dialectical belief that quantum uncertainty only applies to mesoatomic, atomic, and subatomic realms. As an example here, we offer a quote from F. S. C. Northrop's 'Introduction' to Werner Karl Heisenberg's Physics and Philosophy:
We believe that this view is incorrect mainly due its classical legacy underpinnings. In our Quantonics perspective, this is an improper interpretation. Rather, we believe, and believe we have shown, that Ensemble Quantum Umcærtainty is n¤t an 'event' or classical analytic measurable which has stoppable state-ic scalar magnitude, but rather is a variable durati¤n pr¤cess which inv¤lves p¤tentially vast ensembles of quantum reality and applies to all scales of quantum reality! For more detail, see our recent (July, 2002) Quantonic Ensemble Quantum Interrelationships graphic and text. A great classical mistake of analytic reason is to delusionally view c¤mplexity and comcomitant inertia of apparent certainty, plus c¤mplexity and presumed absence of eventual impact of uncertainty as classical historical, predicable, unitemporal, deterministic stability. |
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193 |
"No doubt it does; but an anticipation of this kind has not the slightest resemblance to the anticipation of a voluntary act. Indeed, as we shall see, the reasons which render it possible to foretell an astronomical phenomenon are the very ones which prevent us from determining in advance an act which springs from our free activity. For the future of the material universe, although contemporaneous with the future of a conscious being, has no analogy to it. "In order to put our finger on this vital difference, let us assume for a moment that some mischievous genius, more powerful still than the mischievous
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(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
This, due his quantum ignorance, is a faux pas on Bergson's part. Our quantum multiverses share an animate, but comparatively very low level analogy, of awareness with "conscious beings." Rather, we should say, "We are in our quantum multiverses and our quantum multiverses are in us." We are everywhere associative cowithin our quantum multiverses! Bergson should have said, "...no spatial analogy to it." They are, indeed, durational/quantum_flux analogies of one another. Doug - 29May2002. |
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194 |
"No doubt it would not measure this shortening, and perhaps it would not even perceive it immediately as a change of quantity; but it would realize in some way or other a decline in the usual storing up of experience, a change in the progress usually accomplished between sunrise and sunset. "Now, when an astronomer foretells e.g. a lunar eclipse, he merely exercises in his own way the
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(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
It is extraordinarily easy to discount astronomers as predictors. If astronomers were capable of analytic prediction in a wholly spatial state-ic reality, they would have predicted Shoemaker-Levy's strikes on Jupiter. Actually, we have n¤ analytical access to an absolute certainty that a lunar eclipse, which has occurred regularly prior, will happen again! It may be quantum stochastically probable, but n¤t absolutely certain.
Here, if we call Pirsig's DQ pure duration, and Pirsig's SQ pure analytic spatial extensity, we can see that Bergson places an astronomer's written and drawn machinations completely in SQ. Books are like this. Pictures are like this. They only become one with DQ when we enlighten them on our quantum stages. When we do that we get quantons(DQ,SQ). As Mae-wan Ho might say, "That is one of quantum reality's greatest miracles!" Humans are quantum beings, animate quantum 'computers' if you will. Humans are quantons(DQ,SQ). |
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195 | "Indeed it is even conceivable that this consciousness could live so slow and lazy a life as to take in the whole path of the heavenly body in a single perception, just as we do when we perceive the successive positions of a shooting star as one line of fire. Such a consciousness would find itself really in the same conditions in which the astronomer places himself ideally; it would see in the present what the astronomer perceives in the future [Keep reminding yourself that CTMs claim time identical to space, so "present" and "future" are to a classicist just spatial extensities on a numerable, analytic, homogeneous, infinitely divisible, quantitative 'real' space line. Time, to any classicist, in order to be analyzable, must be space.]. In truth, if the latter foresees a future phenomenon, it is only on condition of making it to a certain extent a present phenomenon, or at least of enormously reducing the interval which separates us from it. In short, the time of which we speak in astronomy is a number, and the nature of the units of this number cannot be specified in our calculations; we may therefore assume them to be as small as we please, provided that the same hypothesis is extended to the whole series of operations, and that the successive relations of position in space are thus preserved. We shall then be present in imagination at the phenomenon we wish to foretell; we shall know exactly at what point in space and after how many units of time this phenomenon takes place; if we then restore to these units their psychical nature, we shall thrust the event again into the future and say that we have foreseen it, when in reality we have seen it." |
(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.) If our natural, physial, intrinsic sensory bandwidth centered roughly at Planck's rate, almost all reality would classically appear to us to stand still. As we mentioned earlier, light itself would classically appear to stand still!
In genuine quantum reality, time is (timings are) n¤t space. Time is (timings are) n¤t singular. Time is (timings are) n¤t analytically inanimate; as Bergson tells us, time (timings) may n¤t be stopped by classical analysis in homogeneous space. Indeed, we should n¤ longer refer time as singular. Instead, we should say "timings." We should use plural/heterogeneous participle grammatics. Timings are processings: "whatings happenings nextings." Quantum timings are as May-wan Ho interpreted Bergson, "indivisiblings (i.e., quantum coherings, everywhere associatings, superpositionings), heterogeneous qualities/qualityings. Quantum timings are n¤nquantifiable! Quantum timings are n¤nanalyzable (Bergson: "processings are n¤nanalyzable")! Quantum timings are n¤nlisr! And so on... Ultimately, quantum timings are classically n¤nconceptual. We may n¤t use spatial equivalents of Earth's rotation and Earth's solar orbit as singular, monistic, OGC/OGT, homogeneous, quantitative, analytic, classical unitime!!! That classical object is n¤t, cann¤t be quantum timings. Quantum timings are n¤t space! Again, quoting Mae-wan Ho, quantum timings are n¤t "a quantitative, infinitely divisible homogeneity." To understand quantum timings we would all be better watching water boil, or a stream's rapids, or Niagara Falls, or contemplate trillions of life emerqings swimming chaotically in Earth's oceans. Quantum timings are burblings, roilings! They follow n¤ classical arrow. They have n¤ spatial direction. They consume n¤ classical space. They are happenings. They are pure DQ-mediated, ubiquitous, everywhere associative, included-middle, animate, heterogeneous quantum processings. So, when classicists write in standard classical mathematical notation, y=f(t), we know their time is only a space proxy; it is 'not' genuine quantum timings! |
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196 | "But these units of time which
make up living duration, and which the astronomer can dispose
of as he pleases because they give no handle to
science,
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(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.) | ||||
197 |
"But when we have to do with a feeling, it has no precise result except its having been felt; and, to estimate this result adequately, it would be necessary to have gone through all the phases of the feeling itself and to have taken up the same duration. Even if this feeling has finally issued in some definite action, which might be compared to the definite position of a planet in space, the knowledge of this act will hardly enable us to estimate the influence of the feeling on the whole of a life story, and it is this very influence which we want to know. All foreseeing is in reality seeing, and this seeing takes place when we can reduce as much as we please an interval of future time while preserving the relation of its parts to one another, as happens in the case of astronomical predictions. But what does reducing an interval of time mean, except emptying or impoverishing the conscious states which fill it? And does not the very possibility of seeing an astronomical period in miniature thus imply the impossibility of modifying a psychological series in the same way, since it is only by taking this psychological series as an invariable basis that we shall be able to make an astronomical period vary arbitrarily as regards the unit of duration? "Thus, when we ask whether a future action could have been foreseen, we unwittingly identify that time with which we have to do in the exact
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(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.) But what if our universe is conscious, as Kafatos, Nadeau, Marcer, et al., describe? Doesn't our universe feel? We claim feeling is n¤t just anthropocentric. |
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198 | "No doubt the identification is made easier by the fact that in a large number of cases we are justified in dealing with real duration as with astronomical time. [i.e., as differences between past and future analytical time] Thus, which we call to mind the past, i.e. a series of deeds done, we always shorten it, without however distorting the nature of the event which interests us. The reason is that we know it already; for the psychic state, when it reaches the end of the progress which constitutes its very existence, becomes a thing which one can picture to oneself all at once. Here we find ourselves in the same position as the astronomer, when he takes in at a glance the orbit which a planet will need several years to traverse. In fact, astronomical prediction should be compared with the recollection of the past state of consciousness not with the anticipation of the future one. But when we have to determine a future state of consciousness, however superficial it may be, we can no longer view the antecedents in a static condition as things; we must view them in a dynamic condition as processes [i.e., flux], since we are concerned with their influence alone. Now their duration is this very influence. Therefore it will no longer do to shorten future duration in order to picture its parts beforehand; one is bound to live this duration whilst it is unfolding. As far as deep-seated psychic states are concerned, there is no perceptible difference between foreseeing, seeing, and acting." | (Our brackets, bold and color, and violet bold italic problematics.) |