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QUOTEs
(Most quotes verbatim Henri Louis
Bergson, some paraphrased.) |
COMMENTs
(Relevant to Pirsig, William James
Sidis, and Quantonics Thinking Modes.) |
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21 |
"If there is a phenomenon which
seems to be presented immediately to consciousness under the
Muscular effort seems
at
first sight to be quantitative. |
form of quantity or at least of
magnitude, it is undoubtedly muscular
effort. We picture to our minds a psychic
force imprisoned in |
the soul like the winds in the cave
of Aeolus, and only waiting for an opportunity to
burst forth: our will is supposed to watch over this force
and from time to time to open a passage for it, regulating the
outflow by the effect which
it is desired to produce. If we consider the matter carefully,
we shall see that this somewhat crude conception of effort plays
a large part in our [classical] belief in intensive magnitudes.
Muscular force, whose sphere
of action is [classical] space and which manifests itself in
[classical] phenomena admitting of measure, seems to us to have
existed previous to its manifestations, but in smaller volume,
and, so to speak, in a compressed [classical] state: hence
we do not hesitate
to reduce this volume more and more, and finally we believe that
we can understand how a purely psychic
state, which does not
occupy space, can nevertheless possess
magnitude. Science, too, tends to strengthen the illusion of common
sense with regard to this point. Bain,
for example, declares that "the sensibility accompanying
muscular movement coincides
with the outgoing stream of nervous
energy:" (1) it is thus just the emission
of nervous force which consciousness
perceives. Wundt also speaks
of a sensation, central in
its origin, accompanying the voluntary innervation of the muscles,
and quotes the example of the paralytic
"who has a very distinct sensation
of the force which
he employs in the effort
to raise his leg, although it remains motionless." (2)"
Note (1): The Senses and the Intellect, 4th ed.,
(1894), p. 79.
Note (2): Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie,
2nd ed. (1880), Vol. i, p. 375. |
(Our brackets, bold, color, violet bold italic problematics
and violet bold problematics.)
Bergson restarts his footnote counts on each page. So to refer
a footnote, one must state page number and footnote number.
Our bold and color highlights follow a code:
- black-bold - important to read if you are just scanning
our review
- orange-bold - text ref'd
by index pages
- green-bold - we see Bergson
suggesting axiomatic, perhaps quantum and even gnostic memes
- violet-bold - an apparent
classical problematic
- blue-bold - we disagree
with this text segment while disregarding context of Bergson's
overall text
- gray-bold - quotable
text
- red-bold - our direct
commentary
Index
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| 22 |
"Most of the authorities adhere
to this opinion, which would be the unanimous view of positive
science were it not
that several years ago Professor William James drew the attention
of physiologists to certain [experimental
investigation of] phenomena
which had been but little remarked, although they were very remarkable.
"When a paralytic strives
to raise his useless limb, he certainly does not
execute this movement,
| The feeling of effort. We are [quantum coherently] conscious not of
an expenditure of force but of the resulting muscular movement. |
but, with or without his will,
he executes another. Some movement is carried out somewhere:
otherwise there is no
sensation of effort. (1) Vulpian
had already called attention to the fact
that if a man affected with hemiplegia
is |
told to clench his paralysed fist, he unconsciously carries
out this action with the fist which is not
affected. Ferrier described
a still more curious phenomenon. (2) Stretch out your
arm while slightly bending your forefinger, as if you were going
to press the trigger of a pistol; without moving the finger,
without contracting any muscle of the hand, without producing
any apparent movement, you will yet be able to feel that you
are expanding energy."
Note (1): W. James, Le sentiment de 1'effort (Critique
philosophique, 1880, Vol. ii,) [cf. Principles of Psychology,
(1891), Vol. ii, chap. xxvi.]
Note (2): Functions of the Brain, 2nd ed. (1886),
p. 386. |
(Our brackets, bold, color, link and violet bold italic problematics.)
Index
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| 23 |
"On a closer examination, however,
you will perceive that this sensation of effort coincides with
the fixation of the muscles of your chest, that you keep your
glottis closed and actively contract your respiratory muscles.
As soon as respiration resumes its normal course the consciousness
of effort vanishes, unless you really move your finger. These
facts already seemed to show that we are conscious, not of an expenditure of force,
but of the [quantum coherent] movement of the muscles which results
from it. The new feature in Professor James's
investigation is that he has verified the hypothesis in the case
of examples which seemed to contradict
it absolutely. Thus when the external rectus muscle of the right
eye is paralysed, the patient tries in vain to turn his eye towards
the right; yet objects seem to him to recede towards the right,
and since the act of volition
has produced no effect, it follows, said Helmholtz, (1) that he
is conscious of the effort of volition.
But, replies Professor James, no
account has been taken of what goes on in the other eye. This
remains covered during the experiments; nevertheless it moves
and there is not much
trouble in proving that it does. It is the movement of the left
eye, perceived by consciousness, which produces the sensation
of effort together with the impression that the objects perceived
by the right eye are moving. These and similar observations lead
Professor James to assert
that the feeling of effort
is centripetal and not
centrifugal."
Note (1): Handbuch der Physiologischen Optik, 1st
ed. (1867), pp. 600-601. |
(Our brackets, bold, color, link, violet bold italic problematics
and violet bold problematics.)
Index
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| 24 |
"We are not
conscious of a force which we are supposed to launch upon our
organism: our feeling of muscular energy at work "is
a complex [quantum affective ensemble] afferent sensation, which
comes from contracted muscles, stretched ligaments, compressed
joints, an immobilized chest, a closed glottis, a knit brow,
clenched jaws," in a word, from all the points of the periphery
where the effort causes an alteration.
"It is not
for us to take a side in the dispute. After all, the question
with which we have to deal is not
| Intensity
of feeling of effort proportional to extent
of our body affected. |
whether the feeling
of effort comes from the
centre or the periphery, but in what does our perception of its
intensity exactly consist?
Now, it is sufficient to observe oneself attentively to |
reach a conclusion on this point which Professor James
has not formulated,
but which seems to us quite in accord with the spirit of his
reaching. We maintain that the more a given effort seems to us
to increase, the greater is the number of muscles which contract
in [quantum coherent] sympathy with it, and that the [classically]
apparent consciousness of a greater intensity of effort at a
given point of the organism is reducible, in reality, to the
perception of a larger surface [i.e., a larger quantum ~Hilbert
isomanifold] of the body [i.e., its quantum
stage] being affected.
"Try, for example, to clench
the fist with increasing force. You will have the
impression of a sensation of effort entirely localized in your
hand and running up a scale of magnitudes."
|
(Our brackets, bold, color, link, and violet bold italic problematics.)
Again,
here, it is we believe helpful to imagine a quanton analogous
to this:
quanton(n¤nactual_SON,actual_SON)
where actual_SON is you/us, and n¤nactual_SON represents
y-our shared ~n¤nconceptual QVF
c¤mplement.
N¤nactual_SON is analogous Bergson's instinct compenetrating
in a c¤mplementary manner, y-our actual_SONs.
Index
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| 25 |
"In reality, what you experience
in your hand remains the same, but the sensation which was
Our consciousness of an increase of muscular effort
consists in the perception of
(1) a greater number of peripheral sensations
(2) a qualitative change in some of them. |
at first localized there has affected your arm
and ascended to the shoulder; finally, the other arm stiffens,
both legs do the same, the respiration is checked; it is the
whole body which is at work. But you fall to notice distinctly
all these concomitant movements unless you are warned of them:
till then you |
thought you were dealing with a single state
of consciousness which changed in magnitude. When you press your lips more and more tightly
against one another, you believe that you are experiencing in
your lips one and the same sensation which is continually increasing
in strength: here again further reflection will show you
that this sensation remains identical, but that certain muscles
of the face and the head and then of all the rest of the body
have taken part in the operation. You felt this gradual encroachment,
this increase of the surface affected,
which is in truth a change of quantity; but, as your attention
was concentrated on your closed lips, you localized the increase
there and you made the psychic force
there expended into a magnitude, although it possessed no
extensity. Examine carefully
somebody who is lifting heavier
and heavier weights: the
muscular contraction gradually spreads
over his whole body. As for the special sensation
which he experiences in the arm which is at work, it remains
constant for a very long time and hardly changes except in quality,
the weight becoming at a certain moment fatigue, and the fatigue
pain." |
(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
What
Bergson just accomplished so beautifully and so eloquently might
slip past us were we n¤t students of Quantonics. When
we generalize a human body classically, we see it as an ideal
classical object. Bergson tells us, "No! No! No! A human body is an ensemble of qualitative affectors."
In Quantonics we call it, "A quantum real quanton
of quantons." Bravo! Bergson. Bergson intuits,
instinctively, quantum reality.
Index
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| 26 |
"Yet the subject will imagine that he is conscious of
a continual increase in the psychic force flowing into his arm.
He will not recognize
his mistake unless he is warned of it, so inclined is he to measure
a given psychic state
by the conscious movements which accompany it! From these facts
and from many others of the same kind we believe we can deduce
the following conclusion: our consciousness of an increase of muscular effort is reducible
to the twofold perception of. a greater number of peripheral
sensations, and of a qualitative change occurring in some of
them.
"We are thus led to define
the intensity of a superficial
effort in the same way as that of a
The same definition of intensity applies
to superficial efforts, deep-
seated feelings
and states intermediate
between the two. |
deep-seated
psychic feeling.
In both cases there is a qualitative progress and an increasing
complexity, indistinctly perceived. But consciousness, accustomed
to think in terms of space and to translate its thoughts |
into words, will denote the feeling by a single word
and will localize the
effort at the exact
point where it yields a useful result: it will
then become aware of an effort which is always of the same nature
and increases at the spot
assigned to it, and a feeling which, retaining the same name,
grows without changing its nature. 'Now, the same illusion of
consciousness is likely to be met with again in the case of the
states which are intermediate between superficial
efforts and deep seated feelings.
A large number of psychic states
are accompanied, in fact, by muscular contractions and peripheral
sensations. Sometimes these superficial elements are coordinated
by a purely speculative idea, sometimes by an idea of a practical
order. In the first case there is intellectual effort
or attention; in the second we have the emotions which may be
called violent or acute: anger, terror, and certain varieties
of joy, sorrow, passion and desire. Let us show briefly that
the same definition of intensity
applies to these intermediate
states."
|
(Our bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
Our Quantonic script shows this nicely:
quanton(qualitative_change,peripheral_sensations).
"Exact point"
is a classical delusion. In Einstein's relativity, which we find
problematic in many
ways, quantum time and space, and thus momentum, energy, temperature,
et al., always form n¤ntrivial quantum c¤mplementary
interrelationships! Locus is always, to some extent, uncertain.
All quantum c¤mplementary interrelationships form quantons
whose Static Value, as an apparent aggregate in actuality, manifests
as a classical object/illusion. Really, they are qualitative
Value:
quanton(absolute_animate_Value,static_Value),
just as Bergson has been explaining. Any human's consciousness,
when trained in CTMs turns quantum real and c¤mplementary
duration into classical state,
locus, and lisr
independence.
From which any classicist may establish 'opposition,' thence
'contradiction,' thence Popperian 'falsifiability,' thence provisional
'scientific proof.' This is SOM's
great deign to feign. This is all plainly and simply classical
putative, 'tautologous' HyperBoole.
J Doug - 20Feb2002.
Index
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