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A Bell's Theorem Study

A Chautauqua
Classical Paradice

Quantum Reality

by Doug Renselle

(Note to readers: This page is at an introductory level only.
We expect to extend this page significantly in futures. Watch for updates.
If you experience difficulty understanding Bell's Theorem, our work here may assist.)

" will be helpful first to provide a bit more in the way of general background which will permit me subsequently to call attention to a wonderful irony in all of this...

"Regarded as a program in natural philosophy, local realism (again putting it crudely) is the position according to which all phenomena are to be embedded into a unified picture of [a classically] general sort. Anyone not already familiar with Bell's theorem might well be at a loss to imagine a phenomenon which is not compatible with local realism, so broad and so innocuous-sounding are its strictures; and yet, as I will attempt to describe more clearly in what follows, we now have strong empirical evidence that indeed there are phenomena which defy embedding in any such local realistic picture of the world.

"I previously alluded to an irony. It is this: Einstein's own worldview, whatever is to be included in a properly detailed characterization of it, surely falls within the bounds of local realism; and yet, the class of experiments which provide the context for Bell's theorem consists of modified versions of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Gedankenexperiment; and these experiments, whose results not only violate Bell-type inequalities, but do so in excellent accord with the predictions of quantum mechanics, provide the evidence which tells against local realism." (Using 'local' Jarrett implies 'naïve.' Our brackets. Our link to our critical review of EPR.)

Jon P. Jarrett
in his paper entitled,
'Bell's Theorem: A Guide to the Implications,'
quoted from pp. 61-2 of
Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory
NDU Press

Caveats: Although we use Jarrett's quote here, we must warn readers that Jarrett's paper is caught up in classical language and terminology in ways very similar EPR's EPR. Jarrett uses several classical terms, e.g., determinism, completeness, conservation, locality, and state. In Quantonics we believe all those terms are invalid in quantum reality when interpreted classically. I.e., we believe quantum reality:

  • is classically indeterminate (there is n¤ general fact of classical 1-1 correspondent cause and effect),
  • its completeness and consistency are quantum flux (i.e, quantum change is) relevant and their classical verity (i.e., classical truth is) irrelevant,
  • is n¤nconservative due its incremental creative emergence ontology,
  • is both local and n¤nlocal, and
  • has n¤ stable classically-stoppable n¤r stopped (zero momentum) states.

Further, to omnifferentiate our perspectives of quantum reality from Jarrett's classical reality (one in which he appears, to us, mired) we view quantum reality as: animate, ensehmble stochastic, selectively superluminal, c¤mplementary, included-middle everywhere-associative, interrelative (entangling, interdependent, compenetrating, interpenetrating, interfusing, co-inside-ing, quantal), islandic (both local and nonlocal), qualitative, subjective, and sophist. To any "naïve realist" (classicist) what we just wrote is "absurd."

In our view, both Jarrett and Baggott suffer another major classical self-delusion: that quantum measurement is anthropocentric. That is how they conclude, "We know that the moon is demonstrably not there when nobody looks." N. David Mermin, p. 50, Ibid. In our view quantum reality is n¤t anthropocentric. We believe all quantons measure. Photons measure, electrons measure, nucleons measure, molecules measure, bugs measure, rocks measure, animals measure, planets measure, and so on... Indeed, Gestaltly, fractally, self-referently, coobsfectively reality measures he-rself.

How did they conclude that moon statement? Quantum reality at meso- and micro-atomic scales "actualizes on measurement." It is better to say that in a more careful manner. "C¤mplementary measurables in quantum reality, in general, may n¤t be measured simultaneously." When we concentrate on one quantum c¤mplement, in general, its other ensehmble quantum c¤mplements "spread out" or arbitrarily distribute themselves in ~Hilbert 'space.' To any "naïve realist" (classicist) those other "spread out" ensehmble quantum c¤mplements cease existence. This issue represents EPR's major CTM failing. But those c¤mplements do exist and are quantum real. Earth's moon is made of a vast number of quantons, all coobsfecting and measuring themselves and others in their moon locale. From a quantum real perspective when we (Is it apparent to you that we, here, issi an ensemble and n¤t singular and n¤t only human? Doug - 22Nov2006.) can't see Earth's moon, it is both there and n¤t there.

How can we be k~n¤wings Moon issi quantum~presentings both when we watch it and when we do n¤t watch it?

Watch Earth's tides both with Moon in view and Moon n¤t in view!
Doug loves to do that on Oregon's central coast on a clear late Summer-Fall night.
Try right behind (west), i.e., on beach, and slightly north of Overleaf Lodge.

Good quantum~query here: "Do we need just sight, only sight, to observe?"
Visible n¤n light 'velocity' flux is only one octave of Nature's ostensible
143 octaves of actual flux, n¤t including Nature's n¤nactual quantum~isoflux.
There is also a subtle hint of quantum~reality in our query too.

Quantonics HotMeme What is Nature's 'average motion?' Quantonics HotMeme

Does a pendulum's swinging measure that? Indeed!

Doug - 22Nov2006.

Earth's Moon isn't where we can measure it, but it is in its real pr¤cess of quantum being. Something similar happens when we leave one room and enter another. Our measurement locale is always in quantum flux, always changing, always quantum uncertain. Similarly, David Bohm agrees...

Michael Talbot in his, The Holographic Universe, tells us how David Bohm sees this situation, "Bohm rejects the idea that particles don't exist until they are observed...He simply feels that most physicists go about it the wrong way, by once again trying to fragment reality and saying that one separate [classically objective, dialectical, analytic] thing, consciousness, interacts with another separate thing, a [classically objective, dialectical, analytic] subatomic particle." See p. 49 of 338 total pages of Talbot's THU. (Our brackets.)

Doug - 2Aug2004.

Always anihmatæly emerscenturing ensehmble quantum c¤mplementary, quantum uncertain "Bell inequalities!"
We call them "Quantonic Interrelationships," AKA "quantons."

One further remark which we believe offers additional insight: Bell-type phenomena, quantum uncertainty, EIMA, quantum c¤mplementarity, arbitrary probability distribution of quantons, and Bergsonian duration are all very similar, analogous, and interrelated, n¤nclassical manifestations of quantum reality.

"Put simply, Bell's theorem says that my idea of naïve realism —

[an] assumption that the physical states of quantum particles like photons are 'real' before they are measured

— is in conflict with the predictions of quantum theory in a way that can be tested in the laboratory in special
experiments on pairs of quantum particles. These experiments [have] been done: quantum theory
[has] been proved right and naïve realism wrong!"

Jim Baggott
from his
to his
The Meaning of Quantum Theory,
OxfUP, 1992.

(Quotes above are acontiguous. Our brackets and italicization of thelogos.)

Don Howard, in his 'Holism, Separability, And The Metaphysical Implications Of The Bell Experiments,' has some rather remarkable comments to make regarding Bell's Theorem. His approach distills to fathoming then criticizing Einstein's academically acquired classicism. Howard thus enables us, as a result, to see Einstein's need to view reality as objective, reducible, and atomistic, with a strong belief in Faraday/Maxwellian field theories and classical penchants for 'localability,' and 'separability.'

Howard does a fabulous job of reconstructing Einstein's intellectual context for us. In fact, Howard needs to do this on several occasions so that he can show us how Einstein may have evolved his personal beliefs. It is fun reading. We read this first in about 1997, perhaps as early as 1996. We keep going back to it, as we grow, and each revisit is packed with fresh ascendancies. Here are some quotes with some of our comments, right (ripe write/wright ) from book margins as we experienced them then and more recently.

To set a tone for what we can expect from Einstein, here is Howard's delectable mast quote,

"The real difficulty lies in the fact that physics is a kind of metaphysics; physics describes "reality." But we do not know what "reality" is; we know it only by means of the physical description!"

—Einstein to Schrödinger, 19 June 1935

So, reader, Howard has a task of understanding what Einstein means by physical, and then interpreting his written words given that plus some inferences regarding Einstein's "(quasi-)real" beliefs.

"But we do not understand why—why a theory's being 'local,' in Bell's sense of the word, leads it to give the wrong predictions, nor why 'nonlocal' quantum mechanics gives the right ones. " Page 225. Our bold of Howard's own classicisms.

"I will argue that the source of this 'nonlocality' is not necessarily a violation of special relativistic locality constraints (the first-signal principle), but instead, perhaps, a kind of ontological holism or nonseparability (already hinted at in the orthodox quantum-mechanical interaction formalism), in which spatiotemporally separated but previously interacting physical systems lack separate physical states and perhaps also separate physical identities." Page 225.

On the separability principle, Howard says that it asserts that the "...contents of any two regions of space-time separated by a nonvanishing spatiotemporal interval constitute separable physical systems, in the sense that (1) each possesses its own, distinct physical state, and (2) the joint state of the two systems is wholly determined by these separate states, in other words, the separability principle asserts that the presence of a nonvanishing spatiotemporal interval is a sufficient condition for the individuation of physical systems and their associated states and that the states thus individuated exhaust the realty that physics aims to describe, that physical wholes are no more than the [analytical] sums of their parts." Page 226. Note references removed. Our bold of Howard's classicisms. Our brackets.

Again, we find these remarks simply delicious. Why? We see them as naught more than Aristotle's apple simile, slightly extended. Apple on tree. Another apple on ground. Spatiotemporal interval as a kind of zeit geist transverse potential transition. Notice how Aristotle's excluded-middle is innate in Howard's description. It is similar to how Aristotle describes an apple falling from a tree. He does not (cannot classically, is incapable to) describe its falling. He describes its two states and calls said state transition an "event." Classical reasoning is incapable of describing any quantum reality without applying state-ic stoppability. Lesson: mimic Aristotle, get in trouble. That, on Doug's quantum stage, is what classicists do. Aquinas did it. Buridan did it. Newton did it. Einstein did it. Modern classicists do it.

What we just described is what Einstein used to develop his special and general relativities. What is unique about Einstein's work, Howard explains rather well.

"Einstein inherited this [classical, Aristotelian] tradition, and his remarks about the separability principle as the only objective criterion of individuation must be seen against that background. His one major departure from the tradition, of course, was his siding with Leibniz in favor of the relational theory of space (or space-time). But he did not follow Leibniz all the way to the conclusion that adoption of the relational point of view deprives us of our last possible objective criterion of individuation. For while position loses its absolute, objective status from the relational point of view, [only in General Relativity, not in Special Relativity] Einstein saw—where Leibniz did not—that a frankly relational property, namely, spatial or spatiotemporal separation, in the guise of the metrical interval, can take the place of position as an objective ground for individuation, since it is a relativistic invariant. [This paragraph is crucial if you want to understand essence of Einsteinian relativity. If you understand what Quantonics means when it says "included-middle," then you can see, here, Einstein's nonquantum classical approximation of an included-middle. We are unsure, but sense this is extremely relevant to Niels Bohr's complementarity being ridiculed by Einstein as "subjective." Would that Niels might have referred Einstein's own notions of separability as (quasi-)"subjective." For a stimulating comparison of views see Gary Zukav's 1978 description of Einstein's relativities in Zukav's Dancing Wu Li Masters.]

"Nevertheless, Einstein's way of seeing the world was shaped by this tradition, so much so that the only alternative he could find to position as a ground of individuation was another spatial (or, again, spatiotemporal) property. This constraint was made even more severe by Einstein's having collapsed the distinction between matter and space-time, between matter and geometry. For Einstein, all physical properties are, from a fundamental point of view, geometrical properties. The metrical interval being the only invariant among the geometrical properties, and hence the only objective property, means that it is the only candidate as a ground for individuation." Page 244. Our brackets. Our bold. (This area of Howard's paper is one of our favorites.)

There is an issue here regarding classical uses of invariant: Perhaps we do not understand what "a relativistic invariant" is. Our problem here is Howard's use of "it" to refer back to "the metrical interval." That "it" is not relativistically invariant! Any classical 'law' which describes that interval is by Einsteinian edict relativistically invariant. That is what 'relativity' is: classical 'laws' which describe classical relationships and relative interactions. Such laws, to us, are in themselves problematic due their assumption of validity of cinematographic stoppability of reality's objective constituents. Even so, given their assumptions, a stopped metrical interval is invariant (classically) under all views from all frames of reference. So any 'law' describing such must, adhering classical 'heritage,' be H. A. Lorentz invariant. Readers should note that quantum reality is an unstoppable reality. Quantum reality is intrinsically incapable of classical invariance. Doug.


Our last sentence above, feels like a downer. For classical science, it is.

However, for quantum science, it is an upper!

Classical invariance and its accoutrements like state, immutability, 1-1 correspondence, cause-effect, induction, and so on... are necessary for classical science's 'existence.' Without those accoutrements classical science disintegrates, massively.

That sounds as though all is lost.

Not to fear dear readers.

Giving up those naïve and silly classical notions offers potential for immense gains. Quantum gains.

Classical science insists that it must control Nature using dialectic and formal mechanism. That apparent control has allowed humankind a great deal of apparent progress during its last two millennia. So, again apparently, to give up classical science feels as though we have to give up all that progress.

That is n¤t what we are saying or offering!

What we are saying is that instead of attempting to control Nature (a futile effort), rather we assume a quantum posture and assist Nature. Become Nature's agents and partners in progress. Why?

Nature will never allow us to control He-r! But what does Nature give us which is even more powerful than any modicum of control over He-r we might seek classically? Nature gives us free will and choice qualified by He-r mandate that we and S-he are an ensemble, actually, quantum ensehmblings. Our free will and choosings affect and are affected by He-r own free will and choosings. N¤ ch¤¤sings of ours are ever uniquely our ch¤¤sings. Our ch¤¤sings can never be objectively independent of He-r choosings and vice versa.

This is what Pirsig and Herrigel mean by "we are in He-r and S-he is in us." (Paraphrased.) That is what we in Quantonics semantically intend by "Nature's n¤n-Aristotelian everywhere-ass¤ciative ihncluded-middlings."

AH has told us that he has a friend who says that evil can never win in any long term. Why? How? Evil has two enemies: itself and Good. Good only has one enemy: evil. We like that parable. Let's use something similar in our discussion here.

Humankind (to be general, less anthropocentric: sentients, e.g., Betelgeuseans, Capellans, etc.) can never completely win without Nature assisting their teams.

Classical science believes we can win by controlling Nature. Classical science has two enemies: itself and Nature.

Quantonics' version of quantum science believes we can only win with Nature's help. We must become quantum agents of Nature. We must be in Nature and assist Nature in He-r being co-inside us. Another way of saying that in quantum comtext of this web page: "We must, sustain, and nurture unlimited Bell inequalities co-with-in Nature and us." Every Value/Quality we have, every Good interrelationship we have is a Natural Bell inequality. Why is It (i.e., any Quality interrelationship, any quanton) an apparent classical inequality? Both Nature and we are in It and quantum ensehmble coobsfecting It. To classicists, It looks like an 'inequality.' Classicists wear blinders, therefore they 'cannot' be in any quantum pr¤cessings of k-now-ing "the rest of the story." Doug - 4Aug2003.

End aside.

On denial of separability, Howard writes, "There are [at least] two ways to deny the separability principle. The more modest concerns the individuation of states: it is the claim that spatiotemporally separated systems do not always possess separable states, that under certain circumstances either there are no separate states or the joint state is not completely determined by the separate states. I call this way of denying the separability principle the nonseparability of states. The more radical denial may be called the nonseparability of systems; it is the claim that spatiotemporal separation is not a sufficient condition for individuating systems themselves, that under certain circumstances the contents of two spatiotemporally separated regions of space-time constitute just a single system." Page 226. Our brackets.

Howard warns us not to confuse separability with locality, and especially not confuse it with Bell's version of locality. Howard tells us that locality asserts that any system's state, "is unaffected by events in regions of the universe so removed from the given system that no signal could connect them. In classical physics, with no theoretical limit on signal velocities, that means any event simultaneous with the momentary state of the given system and separated from it by any finite spatial interval. The relativistic version of the principle asserts that a system's state is unaffected by events in regions of space-time separated from it by a space-like interval. In either case, the aim of the locality principle is to rule out objectionable kinds of action-at-a-distance." Page 227.

Under this method of thing-king, gravity becomes an "objectionable kind of action-at-a-distance."

Contrary to classical expectations, "Thus, it is possible to have a local, but nonseparable theory, quantum mechanics being the most important example. The quantum theory is something of an exception, however, for many of our most important physical theories—among them general relativity and classical field theories, such as classical electrodynamics—satisfy both the locality and separability principles. And the fact of their satisfying both principles is significant, for I will argue that all local, separable theories, including general relativity, are empirically false when applied to the kinds of microphysical interactions examined in the Bell experiments; or rather, that they would have to be false if one elaborated them into theories capable of describing such microphysical interactions...I will also argue that local, separable theories are fundamentally incompatible with quantum mechanics..." Page 227. Note references removed. (This is one of Doug's, of all-life-experiences, favorite quotes! Thank you, Dr. Howard!)

Why is that Howard quote so important to our students, Quantonics, and Doug?

It is a big step in a ladder of standingunder which allows us to eidetically grasp, almost ad oculos, that quantum reality's middle is included. And once we grasp that, all of Aristotle's syllogisms fall apart! Then classical science falls apart...and then...and then.. and then... A quantum tsunami of unheralded change!
Doug - 25Jul2003.

"We confront here a radical physical holism at odds with our classical intuitions about the individuation of systems and states, and it is precisely this feature of the quantum theory that enables it to provide the correct predictions in the Bell experiments. But the quantum formalism by itself offers neither a deeper explanation of nonseparability nor an account of its larger significance for our understanding of the physical world. This is where physics stops and where metaphysics must show the way; at least until the path is clear enough to allow physics to proceed again." Page 228.

Howard's technical and theoretical efforts from this point on are more challenging, at least for us. We have to read a page. Then re-read it. And so on until we absorb its essence and quintessence. It is essentially a rehash of what has already been said. We choose, from this point forward, just to quote his most provocative and stimulating remarks. We suggest to our students that they consider this text mandatory reading for their work here in Quantonics.

One other less relevant, but still valuable comment: Pirsig's work in his Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and Lila provides philosophical underpinnings for issues of Bell inequalities which Howard, et al., discuss herein. Again, students, read them. Reread them. Again...

"Quantum mechanics, for example, violates completeness but satisfies Jarrett locality." Page 230.

Regular readers are familiar with Quantonics' versions of completeness:


Consistent - Always states the truth
Complete - States all truths


Consistent - Always changes
Complete - Changes all

Those comparisons are important here since Howard avoids discussing quantum reality's absolute animacy. Recall: that meme is at heart of Pirsig's Dynamic Quality and William James Sidis' comparison: The Animate and the Inanimate. Too, William James' (godfather of Sidis) flux, and Henry Louis Bergson's: 1) reality is unstable and 2) objects in reality are not independent. (Our negative paraphrase of Bergson's positive statements.)

"...since the most novel, nonclassical feature of the quantum-mechanical interaction formalism is precisely its denial of the separability of the states of the two systems [or N systems]. Nevertheless, in the original proof of Bell's theorem, as in the proof of Jarrett's theorem, a single joint state for the two systems was assumed,..." Page 231. Our brackets.

This is the issue of EIMA or what Quantonics calls "Everywhere Included-Middle Associativity (mostly via arbitrary heteropragmaspatiotemporal probability distribution, i.e., e.g., photons, electrons, and nucleons are Philip R. Wallacean "macroscopic")." It is relevant to both com(n)trafactualness and definiteness which we discuss in much greater detail below. EIMA is progenitor of Bell's inequalities. (And Heisenberg's quantum uncertainty, Zeno's stoppability paradice, etc. It is why we use a comma-nospace in our Quantonics script for quantons.)

" is hardly irrelevant that our one correct theory of microphysical interactions, the quantum theory, is a local, nonseparable theory." Page 232.

Howard goes on to say that Einstein felt that modern field theories handle inseparability. But Howard denies that. On what basis? He does not use our words, but basically his reason is that modern field theories are classically radically mechanical, with reduction, identities, infinitesimals, continua, etc.

Except for some of Howard's own legacy classical penchants, we mostly agree with him. Certainly, he is near an apex of humans who, in our view, most closely standunder quantum reality and 'quantum (non)mechanics.'

Howard as so many others speculates whether quantum theory, and specifically quantum mechanics, can accomplish a description of reality which manages issues of both locality and separability well. But those are not the only two issues which are problematic. Howard apparently misses, again as do so many others, that mechanics appears to be our major problem. Also, we think it necessary to take a Zoharian approach of both-and. Further, we believe we must extend her notion to both-all-while-and-many. That admits a n¤vel quantum reality which is additionally absolutely animate and heterogeneous (which moves us away from classical monism, and into quantum reality's genuine pluralism). We add some other hues which we already mentioned: included-middle (which one may infer from a both-while-and), and everywhere associativity (which is somewhat derivative of a quantum notion of included-middle), and further, belies any classical notions of Platonic-ideal locality, which belies classical mathematics' notions of 'independence.' To be sure, there are others, many others. Quantum reality is not a simple, trivial reality like classical mechanics. That is part of why classical mechanics fails in its attempts to describe quantum reality of which Bell's Theorem is a superb example.

Using Zohar's meme we treat separability and locality like this, using our quantonic script:

quantum_l¤calityquantons(n¤nl¤cality,l¤cality), and

Readers can see a rough graphical analogy of what we intend here.

Gravity is an example of a quantum phenomenon which is inseparable from any quantum locality, on all 'scales' of quantum reality.

We like what Howard has to ask about issues surrounding locality and separability on page 251, "If quantum mechanics itself is not a candidate for a fundamental nonseparable theory that we seek, what other possibilities exist? In particular, what are the possibilities for a theory that would be nonseparable both in the way it individuates states and in the way it individuates systems?"

Of course this is but one of many major accomplishments Quantonics may claim. Quantonics is a quantum n¤nmechanics, and that is what is critical to achieve, as David Bohm suggested so many decades ago. Howard has already seen glimmers of great difficulties with classical thing-king (CTMs). Quantonics offers a "New way of quantum think-king (QTMs)." We offer new language, scripts, fonts, animations, included-middles, everywhere-associations, hermeneutics, semiotics, and heuristics in attendance with our QTMs.

Let's stop there for now. If you are very much more interested in additional comments, please contact us:

To contact Quantonics write to or call:

Doug Renselle
Quantonics, Inc.
Suite 18 #368 1950 East Greyhound Pass
Carmel, INdiana 46033-7730

above quotes are selected
(with intent of assisting readers to better grasp Bell's Theorem and its vast ramifications for Earth and humankind)
quotations of
Don Howard
in his paper entitled,
'Holism, Separability, And The Metaphysical Implications Of The Bell Experiments,'
quoted from pp. 224-253 of
Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory
NDU Press


It is our view that Quantonics offers superior ways of thinking about and interpreting reality. Quantonics achieves higher plateaux of thought several ways, chiefly using Robert M. Pirsig's Metaphysics of Quality (MoQ), and quantum science.

We think Bell's Theorem offers us an opportunity to show you that superiority, and this document offers you a taste of it.

What we will do here is use text from a Bell's Theorem decision tree in Gary Zukav's superb book, Dancing Wu Li Masters. First we will show his decision tree as tabular text similar to Gary's original portrayal of it. He portrayed Bell's Theorem classically, but he did not show SOM's either/or dichotomies separated and enclosed by SOM's schismatic wall. As you will see below, we use a triple-line border to illustrate SOM's wall.

Then we will migrate to a more Quantonic view using Quantonic language for classical dyads that we call "dichons," and Pirsig calls logically positive bivalent "platypi." Dichons statically model ideal classical, objective, closed, propertyesque dyadic interactions.

Finally we will migrate that emphasized classical view to a mixture of labeled 'classical' dyads and Quantonic omniads mixed together as quantons. Let's look at some examples which will introduce and perhaps help clarify our intent:

dichon(dyad_1, dyad_2)
SOM's wall
This is an example of a classical dichon with its two classical static (state-ic) quantitative propertyesque dyads, excluded-middle separated by SOM's 'comma-space' wall.

Here we see an example of a quantum quanton with its two quantum dynamic qualitative value interrelationship omniads, included-middle commingling via MoQ's 'comma-nospace,' "direct value interrelationship experiences." This quantonic notation demonstrates what we call "inclusive," i.e., "included-middle" quantum c¤mplementarity.

Here we can make a direct Quantonic comnection with Bell's Theorem. From a classical conspective, all quantons are "Bell Inequalities." That is why classicists, i.e., naïve realists, use dichons: to try to eliminate any possibilities of "Bell Inequalities."

All quantons exhibit countless quantum interrelationship phenomena:

  • "Bell Inequalitites,"
  • quantum uncertainties,
  • quantum included-middlings,
  • quantum heterogeneity (e.g., "omni-"ad),
  • quantum EIMAings,
  • quantum animacy (flux is crux),
  • quantum superluminal correlationings,
  • quantum tunnelings,
  • quantum entanglings,
  • quantum emergent, unstoppable, Bergsonian 'durational' processings,
  • and on and on and on...

Our comma-no-space is how we remind our students that our list of quantum phenomena manifest among quantons and quantons of quantons. Our comma-no-space "tears down" naïve realism's classical, dichonic, SOM wall. Naïve realists deny any reality of our list of those quantum real phenomena. To them, our list is "absurd."

We will QELR above text after you regulars have a chance to digest our heuristics. To do it yourself, change 'o' characters to quantized '¤' characters. Change some 'i' characters to 'i' characters. Change some 'e' characters to 'æ' characters. 'Un' to 'um,' 'is' to 'issi,' amd so on...

dichon(omniad_1, omniad_2), AKA
dichon(complement_1, complement_2),
                   SOM's wall
This is what Niels Bohr did to his Copenhagen Interpretation of complementarity. Our dichonic notation vividly depicts what Bohr called "exclusive," i.e., (Aristotelian) "excluded-middle" ~quantum complementarity. (Added 16Jan2002 - Doug.)

Last, an example of a quantum quanton with two classical dyads. Classical dyads are 'ideal' objects. As such they are ideally and intentionally closed to 'undesirable and naked' interrelationships in any classical model of reality.

However, even classical objects are 'naked' as quantons in quantum reality. They will have some unpreventable value interrelationships. We show this vividly in our Darwin's Chip review.

Still, their potential value interrelationships may be somewhat constrained if they were classically designed not to allow (ideally) any value interrelationships. Most classical dyads are intentionally designed to be 'objective:' closed, functionally homogeneous, to prevent most 'pathological' value interrelationships.

You may imagine a classical dyad as our Quantum Egg with its bottom wave portion classically, objectively, intentionally 'designed out' or 'cut/knifed out' as much as possible. In reality, SOM's designed-in 'wall' is only partially successful. Reality's isoflux commingles even 'classical' objects/dyads.

Some examples of classically designed dyads are: most words in Western cultural languages, mathematical symbols in classical mathematics, nuts, bolts, Object-Oriented methods, PCs, automobiles, boards, nails, bandaids, communication systems, predicate logic symbols and propositions, flip-flops, etc.

Examples of quantum omniads are: all of quantum reality's comstituents. An excellent applied example of a quantum omniad is a qubit. Let's use our Quantonics script to exemplify what a qubit possibly looks like (a qubit being transition, AKA quantum qubit changæ):

qubitquanton(isocoherent,coherent) (from actuality)

(i.e., before affective, quantum measurement)

qubitquanton(isocoherent,decoherent) (to actuality)

(i.e., after affective, quantum measurement; consider that
our qubit's wave function does n¤t classically "collapse" )

Another possible qubit example looks like this (a qubit becoming transition, AKA quantum qubit emergence):

qubitquanton(isocoherent,isocoherent_tentative) (from n¤nactuality)

(i.e., before affective, quantum measurement)

qubitquanton(isocoherent,coherent) (to actuality)

(i.e., after affective, quantum measurement;
qubit's wave function similarly does n¤t classically "collapse")

Our qubit transitionings shown just above (late 2001) are quantonic script precursors of what we, years later (~2005) show as:

QLOFuzzonBosonFermion Ontology


Generation III Quantum Reality Loop.

Doug - 18Apr2006.

Also see our list of omnifferences among quantum qubits vis-à-vis classical digits.

A good classical counter example is that dyads are notably incapable of encapsulating and enclosing biologicals within any walls of SOM's "Church of Reason." Biologicals could not emerge and dynamically age were they built using classical dyads.

As we hopefully clarified in our list above, quantons dynamically model real c¤mplementary quantum interrelationships when their parameters are Quantonic (i.e., omniadic fluxors). When their parameters are static (i.e. state-ic), like SOM's dyads, our quantons only depict, for our limited local purposes here, static SOM things framed in a Quantonic comtext. We shall use three out of four of these examples in our Bell's Theorem study below. (We choose n¤t to use a Bohrian "exclusive" complementarity example below in our Bell's Theorem study. Why? We have Bohr's prolific works to show his intentions and classical "(un-)ambiguities." Doug - 16Jan2002.)

Our sequence of transitions will take you only part way to a full Quantonic picture of quantum reality, but you will see our Chautauqua evolve from classical paradice into one unique perspective of quantum reality.

We will build our first table derived from Gary Zukav's flow chart on page 317 of his Dancing Wu Li Masters (paperback, 350 page edition):


Legend 1 -

  • SOM's closed, "exclusive" Wall,
  • Either/Or, and
  • Implies for a Classical View of Bell's Theorem

Figure 1 - Classical Bell's Theorem Originally Depicted by Gary Zukav as a Decision Tree

We want to re-interpret this table using our Quantonic Think-king Modes. However, before we do, we want to review some SOM vis-à-vis MoQ fundamentals. Looking at our SOM tabular version of Bell's Theorem above, in Figure 1, what do we see?

We see SOM's closed, dichotomous, either/or, objective approach to analyzing reality.

First, we see Bell ask this SOM, either yes or no question: Is it possible to model reality? SOM's answer is only one of two possibilities:

  • Either it is possible to model reality,
  • Or it is not possible to model reality.

Those two bullets exemplify perfectly what we mean in Quantonics when we say "SOM uses Classical Thing-king Methods, or CTMs." Each statement is a formal monad. SOM's wall

(Aristotle's excluded-middle syllogism, i.e.:

classical_monad_object_A is classically not both monad_object_A and not_monad_object_A;

reader please consider how this classical syllogism innately denies quantum reality!)

denies any complementarity or c¤mplementarity twixt these two dyadically either/or related monads. So we may conclude, when we use CTMs that decision row one in our table above is an either/or

dichon(Either_it_is_possible_to_model_reality, Or_it_is_not_possible_to_model_reality).

(Our comma-space above in our last sentence's dichon
represents SOM's excluded-middle Aristotelian wall.)

Quantum science and our Quantonic interpretation of it say it is better if we use Quantonic Think-king Modes (QTMs) to study Bell's Theorem.

As we have shown you
elsewhere in Quantonics, QTMs would answer paralogically like this:

  • It is both possible to model reality,
  • And it is 'not' possible to model reality.

Both of these statements are quantum c¤mplements (Mu's) of one another.

Classicists call our above quantum paralogic, "equivocation and prevarication." To classical minds adept at parlaying their (inept) CTMs, quantum paralogic is "bivalently FALSE" logic. See our Buridan Review. Quantum reality is both equivocal (i.e., both-all/and contrafactual (~in-)definite, i.e. always quantum umcærtain, while allowing for an illusion of quantum-local definiteness) and prevaricative (i.e., emits apparitional "paradoxical falsehoods" in classical contexts).

But what about that classical 'not' Doug? Good question. Classically 'not' is formally and radically mechanistic. A classical 'not' implies formal classical negation. However, Henri Louis Bergson, et al., show that classical negation is not real when interpreted as formal negation. They show that negation is subjective. Some of them did 'not' realize it, but they show that, in a quantum or Quantonic comtext, 'not' is a quantum c¤mplementary term. Our coined version of a quantum c¤mplementary 'not' is 'n¤t.' Also see our n¤vel Quantonics' English Language Remediation of n¤t

Assuming our use of 'not' is quantum, then our two bullet statements quantum included-middle compenetrate one another as quantum c¤mplements. Both statements taken together form a both/and (see:
BAWAM) quantum c¤mplementary quanton. Why? How? They are quantum real. Reality is quantum. Reality's comstituents are quantons.

All of this shows us that there is a quantum, included-middle, umcærtainty interrelationship animately entangling these two c¤mplements.

There is much more to discuss, but let us just consider one other classical assumption Bell made and Zukav made when they did their classical analyses. Residing in CTMs they assumed reality is analytic. That assumption forced them to see their reality 'model' as classically analytic. Notice our use of 'model' as singular. They assumed only
one classical model was possible. And their assumption of classical analyticity means their classical model is exclusive, limited, and closed axiomatically into a subset of Static Quality.

Their uses of CTMs also force them to view singular static models as implicitly inanimate except for analytic uni-temporal objective motion, e.g. classical object y=f(t). CTMs permit orthodox practitioners (an axiomatically assumed convenience) to uni-temporally stop classical reality and thus allow objective state-ic observation of any classically contrived model.

Also note, in decision row two, in their classical view of Bell's theorem how their classical analyticity forces them to assume classical causation. Consider that they did not even question whether causation is problematic in their 'analyses.' They assumed one cause and one effect. Outcome: Only one possible static model of reality! CTMs deny both quantum pluralism and quantum Dynamic Quality's existence, again, axiomatically. Their works have ingrained much classical unilogical Boole! But, without their work as an example, we might not show you a much better Quantonic way. (For our unique quantonic perspective on causation vis-à-vis free will, see our December, 2001 Two Key CTM Disablers and One Key QTM Enabler. Also see a companion treatise on Free Will in our November, 2001 News.)

There is a term used in Zukav's flow chart, and we use it in our table above, which may be unfamiliar to you. Actually it has several forms: contrafactual definite, contrafactualness, definiteness, counterfactual definite, etc. In his book, Zukav writes that Henry Stapp claims contrafactual definiteness means this:

  • Sentients (specifically humans) have free will to and are able to 'measure' reality, and
  • Sentients' measurements do produce definite (certain) results for all choices of measurement.

This terminology, viewed classically, is a source of grief for classicists who use CTMs to attempt any understanding of reality.

Those of you who understand Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, know that measurements (human or otherwise) are classically uncertain. With that, essentially, classical contrafactual definiteness falls apart.

Using our Quantonics approach, though, let's coin a new term. Let's coin '
comtrafactual definiteness.' We claim our new term means:

  • Quantons have free will to and are able to 'measure' reality, and
  • Quantons' measurements (based upon ensehmble affective preconditions) produce ensehmble quantum umcærtain results for all choices of measurement (i.e., quantum-real measurements may only achieve stochastic ensehmble event determinism; this kind of quantum determinism is actually a classical 'indeterminism;' Why? It only predicts a probability of an ensehmble of affects, n¤t a single classically-caused effect.).

Those of you who are students of Quantonics may see now how comtrafactualness uncloaks quantum reality's many islands of truth. Many quantum comtexts. Many truths! This is precisely how quantum reality rebuffs classical axioms of independence, localability, isolability, separability, reducibility, commutativity, distributivity, factorability, etc. This is why we say, "CTMs are naïve." This is why we say QTMs are better, especially if you want to do more realistic modeling of reality. Very briefly let's comsider some differences twixt a homological monistic classical 'model' of reality and many pluralistic quantum models of reality:

  • One Monistic Classical Model of Reality: Is a state-ic model of reality. It uses formal, radically mechanistic, objective logic. Its basis is stable material substance. SOMites say, "We can model objective reality absolutely using formal axiomatic analytic reasoning methods (CTMs). Since reality is classically monistic, we can create GUTs and TOEs of reality."
  • Many Monistic Classical Models of Reality: This is post modern cultural relativism. Basically this is just objective plurality. Many relativistic state-ic objective views or models of reality.
  • Many Pluralistic Quantum Modelings of Reality: Are dynamic quanton (n¤n objective) modelings of reality. They use c¤mplementary, radically stochastic, quantum logic. Their bases are Planck rate and subharmonic fluxors (absolute quantum flux). MoQites say, "Using our quantum stages and quantons and QTMs as our means, we are modeling quantum reality. All our quantum modelings are quantum umcærtain. Since reality is quanton(quanton(monism,pluralism),quanton(pluralism,monism)), we can create unlimited modelings of reality." In our reality quanton(monism,pluralism), we ask students of Quantonics to visualize that quanton like this: quanton(isocohesive_quantum_isoflux,mixed_quantum_flux).

    Since we wrote bullet three above, we unearthed differences twixt Pirsig's quantum view of reality and our derived perspective of Bergson's quantum view of reality. See Pirsig vis-à-vis Bergson on Monism and Pluralism. What distills from this n¤vel treasure is:

    1. We kn¤w that quantum_realityquanton(n¤nactuality,actuality)
    2. We can infer that quanton(m¤nism,pluralism) implies n¤nactuality is m¤nistic (i.e., quantum is¤c¤hesive) and actuality is pluralistic (i.e., many quantum comtexts and truths), which aligns Pirsig's m¤re quantum view ¤f reality
    3. Bergson shows us that when we examine quantum reality from a more classical perspective, with intent on finding classical ills, we can infer quanton(pluralism,m¤nism) where n¤nactuality is pluralistic (i.e., unlimited p¤ssibilities) and actuality is m¤nistic (i.e., a classical perspective of spatial extensity, its concomitant analyticity, and objective homogeneity)
    4. All ¤f which just further c¤nfirms what we may anticipate as quantum realities' b¤th-all/andedness (see: BAWAM) when we ask these tw¤ quantum questi¤ns:
      1. Is quantum n¤nactuality a m¤nism ¤r is it a pluralism?
      2. Is quantum actuality a m¤nism ¤r is it a pluralism?
    5. Our quantum answer in each case is "Yes!" This paral¤gical answer sh¤uld be n¤ surprise. All quant¤ns are b¤th m¤nisms and pluralisms. All quant¤ns' comjugates and c¤njugates are b¤th m¤nisms and pluralisms.
    6. Then extending number 1 ab¤ve,
      quanton(m¤nism,pluralism), and
    7. As Bergson enlightens us, SOM (classical method of thing-king, CTM) only conceives actuality's monism, and assiduously denies its pluralism, and Quantonics shows extensively how SOM viscerally opposes any memes of nonactuality as "absurd," and "subjective."

By comparison to SOM's dichon, now, we see a MoQ/Quantonic


which we might animate to our quantum advantage like this:


(Our comma-without-space above in our quantons represents MoQ's
quantum included-middle n¤n-Aristotelian interrelationships.)

and we must assume our modeling is quantumly both dynamic and static, i.e., quanton(dynamic_flux,static_flux). From this we may see how Pirsig's MoQ showed us that reality models itself as quanton(DQ,SQ). We can show — that fundamental quanton(dynamic,static) — applies to all quantum reality. All quantons of reality are both dynamic and static, and they share c¤mplementary, c¤mpenetrating interrelationships — Quantonic interrelationships. (Note: Pirsig's SQ is n¤t classically static. It is quantum static. Quantum static flux is actualized (via quantum measurement) from nonactualized quantum dynamic flux. Quantum static flux is always emerging, mutating, or demerging under impetus from quantum dynamic flux. Pirsig's DQ is quantum reality's absolute changæ impetus. SQ is DQ's actualized agent of pluralistic evolute changæ. For a superb example of "persistent, inertial quantum 'static/latched/fretted/measured/decoherent' flux," see our qubit example near page top. This is a most difficult aspect of quantum reality to describe. Why? As yet, we have n¤ memes for Feynmanesque "understanding" how it happens. Closest we can offer is our heuristic, graphical quantum actualization ontology. Now, in 2004, we can offer more heuristics. See our 2004 fermionta and our 2004 Generation III Quantum Reality Loop. Doug - 7Nov2004.)

Thus, it becomes quite obvious that, both Bell and Zukav were classically blinded to any modeling of reality being, first:

  • animate, and second
  • a quantum c¤mplementary both/and commingling of Static Quality and Dynamic Quality.

QTMs assume reality is animate, and that DQ is real and exists, and further that DQ is SQ's quantum c¤mplement. SOMwits who practice CTMs deny such a statement as, "ridiculous and absurd."

And thus we have just another of many examples of how CTMs are inferior thing-king methods. They deny reality's most important ingredients: Dynamic Quality AKA Quantum Vacuum Flux, or Quantonic N¤nactuality.

So both Bell and Zukav assumed reality is only a subset of SQ, i.e., a subset of quantum reality's actual c¤mplement. They left out reality's dynamic, n¤nactual c¤mplement. They assumed a classical reality.

A Quantonic approach, while still limited, offers much better and more c¤mplete results.

Allow us to ease into our Quantonic approach by showing two more tables. That approach may assist our quantum stages' evolutions from CTMs to QTMs. Let's juxtapose one table with classical dichons and another with quantons.

With dichons:

Figure 2 - Classical Bell's Theorem Depicted Using Quantonics' Dichons and SOM's Wall

Consider any subjective nature of "No Reality Models Possible" based on our comments above regarding classical interpretations of 'not.' And remember how classicists consider such a statement 'absolute.' Did you get that? Classicists 'conceive' no and not as formal logical 'absolutes.' Yet they derived their formal predicate logic from an Aristotelian, physical, material substance foundation! And their logic is inutile dealing with quantum physical reality!

Henceforth, as good MoQites, we must learn to distinguish our comtexts. As classical pretenders (…when in SOM, do as…), we must pretend that we hear classicists' no/not remarks as dichons. As quantum MoQites, we must real-ize their subjectivity. We must role-play our quantum sophism.

There are few better ways to antagonize classicists than to show them their uses of 'not' and 'no' are subjectives. Have fun!

In our table just above we retain all of Zukav's original statements; however, we show them as classical legacy either/or dichons.

It will be useful for you to comsider our term definitions for
dichon and quanton and how very different they are from one another.

In Zukav's original flow chart, he placed a big black 'X' over "Predictions of Quantum Mechanics Are Incorrect," showing his readers that dyad is not even classically acceptable since empirical results from quantum experimentation deny it.

Zukav published Dancing Wu Li Masters in 1978, so some of his other terms, at that time, seemed classically "absurd." Since then, superluminal (~zero latency; i.e., zer¤ implies a single Planck quantum of latency; Doug - 17Jan2002) quantum transitions have been demonstrated often and quantum-unambiguously. Also, since then, any percept of Super Determinism has been resoundingly denied. Super Determinism denies quantum creation. It denies quantum evolute pluralism. It is hilt classicism: Super Analyticity. It is just more SOM

But his "Many Worlds" percept appears to be gaining momentum. Quantum reality appears to be heterogeneous, unlike homogeneous, monolithic classical reality. As a result, quantumly, we see many: times, masses, gravities, lengths, truths, incommensurabilities, comtexts, and on and on and on… Quantum reality, as Nick Herbert, et al., have said, "Appears to be many-islandic."

Next lets show a similar table, Figure 3, using quantons in place of dichons, and let's update Zukav's classical either/or statements:


Legend 2 -

  • MoQ's open, "inclusive" face of changæ,
  • quanton(both/and),
  • Implies, and
  • Classical for a Quantonics' View of Bell's Theorem

Figure 3a - Classical Bell's Theorem Depicted Using Quantonics' Quantons and MoQ's Face of Changæ

Reader, pay particular attention to our ellipse above in Figure 3a, labeled 'Quantum Reality.' It 'encapsulates' some essence of quantum reality. Greatest value of Figure 3a is that it shows beautifully how inept CTMs are at using formal 'logic' to understand reality. Without QTMs, we would n¤t be able to show you this blatant SOM ineptness. It also shows that 'failure' is not failure, rather it offers success if one is willing to changæ one's ways of thinking.

Figure 3b is a simple extension of 3a showing an extended portion of quantum reality which includes superluminality as did Gary Zukav's original decision tree:

Figure 3b - Classical Bell's Theorem - Figure 3a Extended Showing Quantum Reality as a Quanton of a Quanton

Figure 3b shows us that quantum reality's classically perceived dichonic absurdities ("failures") — when viewed with Quantonic optics — become quantum included-middle both-all/while/and-many "inclusive-" c¤mplementary opportunities. Gary Zukav's classical decision tree method is innately (by classical design) incapable of showing our real quantum outcomes.

Please remember that our quantons represent:

  • quantum c¤mplementary pairs of quantum omniads,
  • quantum c¤mplementarity as included-middle subjective n¤ts,
    • quantum subjective n¤ts imply that any omniad has potentially all of reality as its c¤mplement,
    • quantum included-middle means that quantons' omniads may compenetrate potentially all reality,
  • both dynamic (unlatched isoflux) and static (latched flux) c¤mplements of reality,
    • using Pirsig's MoQ semiotics we show this simply as quanton(DQ,SQ),
  • etc.

For Millennium III make a millennial resolution to gradually unlearn CTMs and replace their naïveté with QTMs. Evolve yourself from SOM thing-king toward MoQ think-king!

1Jan2001 Doug.  

To contact Quantonics write to or call:

Doug Renselle
Quantonics, Inc.
Suite 18 #368 1950 East Greyhound Pass
Carmel, INdiana 46033-7730

©Quantonics, Inc., 2000-2027 — Rev. 27Jan2015  PDR — Created 31Dec2000  PDR
(6Jan2001 rev - Clarify paragraph on dichonic dyads and quantonic omniads with a table comparing them.)
(7Jan2001 rev - Change Figure 3 to two figures: 3a and 3b. 3b illustrates an extension of quantum reality from 3a.)
(9Jan2001 rev - Change some 'con' to 'com' prefixes. Clarify 'syllogism.' Repair typos.)
(13Jan2001 rev - Typos. Add red text on classical monistic model and quantum pluralistic modeling of reality.)
(13Jan2001 rev - Add note on classical 'static' vis-à-vis quantum 'static.')
(30Jan2001 rev - Repair typos.)
(12Mar2001 rev - Add link to 'paradice' def. Add Pirsig's platypus/platypi as analogue of dyad.)
(12Mar2001 rev - Add link to quantum 'n¤t' def.)
(26Mar2001 rev - Correct minor grammatical aberations. Add some clarifications. Change some classical 'nots' to quantum 'n¤ts.')
(20Apr2001 rev - Add link to our Pirsig vis-à-vis Bergson monism-pluralism page.)
(23May2001 rev - Correct spelling errors. Extend some text, in red.)
(22Jun2001 rev - Add 'Contrafactual Definite' anchor to Stapp's classical definition above.)
(22Jun2001 rev - Add parenthetical t¤ sec¤nd bullet ¤f ¤ur 'comtrafactual definite' definiti¤n.)
(31Oct2001 rev - Add more detail to 'contrafactual definiteness' discussion. Add a CR bullet there.)
(9Dec2001 rev - Add top of page frame-breaker. Add causation commentary and links.)
(28Dec2001 rev - Add 'omniad' qubit example at page top. Add 'ing' suffixes.)
(5Jan2002 rev - Correct 23May2001 aside: change two to three.)
(16Jan2002 rev - Add Bohrian dichonic/classical version of complementarity to page-top table. Other minor reformatting, etc.)
(17Jan2002 rev - Change all Bohrian occurrences of 'complementar...' to quantum 'c¤mplementar...' See dated updates, plus.)
(18Jan2002 rev - Add anchor to our 'qubit' description near page top.)
(28Jan2002 rev - Change all quantum comtextual occurrences of classical '...omplemen...' to quantum '...¤mplemen...')
(13Feb2002 rev - Extend our 'qubit' description near page top.)
(24May2002 rev - Add more links to expanded qubit description near page top.)
(24Jun2002 rev - Correct minor typo: plural possessive quantons' vis-à-vis quantons.)
(23Jul2002 rev - Change QELR links to A-Z pages.)
(5Sep2002 rev - Remediate quantum comtextual occurrences of 'change' and 'uncertain[].')
(26Sep2002 rev - Remediate all quantum comtextual occurrences of 'ensemble.')
(5Feb2003 rev - Add link to our QELR of 'commutative.')
(4May2003 rev - Change wingdings arrows to GIFs for compatibility.)
(2Jul2003 rev - Add top of page Baggott quote.)
(10-11Jul2003 rev - Add top of page Jarrett quote. Add some fresh links.)
(12Jul2003 rev - Extend page top quotes.)
(24Jul2003 rev - Add anchor to our quote of Jarrett's statement re: Einstein's realism as naive.)
(25Jul2003 rev - Extend our page top quotes with cogent remarks from Don Howard.)
(4Aug2003 rev - Add blue text to our Howard mini review.)
(10Aug2003 rev - Reset some legacy red text to black. Remove legacy update anotations. Extend quanton page top discussion.)
(19Aug2003 rev - Link Jarrett's, Mermin's, Baggott's "Moon not there when nobody looks" to EPR's "no physical reality.")
(25Aug2003 rev - QELR some of our own recent red-text page top prose. Add some links.)
(14Sep2003 rev - Add short 'belies,' i.e., 'gives lies to,' blue text near end of top of page Howard quuotes.)
(7Jan2004 rev - Add 'think' link to 'thing-king' under our page top Howard quotes.)
(20Jan2004 rev - Add quantum comtext actual to special 'c¤njugation.')
(10May2004 rev - Reset all legacy red & blue text. Add 'ensemble stochastic' What is Wrong with Probability link at page top Jarrett discussion.)
(18Jul2004 rev - Add link to QELR of 'empirical.')
(2Aug2004 rev - Add Bohm red text quote under our Mermin criticism.)
(7Nov2004 rev - Reset red text. Add 'fermionta,' and 'QR Gen III Loop' links. Adjust some text colors.)
(27Feb2005 rev - Add 'Invariant Metrical Interval' anchor to Don Howard quote near page top.)
(5Dec2005 rev - Add some near page top Jarrett comments links.)
(6Jan2006 rev - Clean up some legacy mark-ups. Add some links. Adjust some SOM excluded-middle arrow markers.)
(18Apr2006 rev - Update 'qubit' discussion near page top.)
(6Sep2006 rev - Superpose 'ad oculos' link.)
(22Nov2006 rev - Add 'Mermin Assumes Anthropocentrism' anchor. Add Moon is both there and not there test. Add 'Nature's average motion' HotMeme™.)
(12Sep2007 rev - Reformat page. Correct some contact information.)
(14Aug2008 rev - Highlight 'first signal principle' in bold violet under page top Don Howard quotes.)
(15Apr2009 rev - Make page current. Reset legacy markups. Change some wingdings fonts to gifs.)
(19Jul2011 rev - Add 'fractal' link to "How to do quantum~fractals.")
(22Apr2014 rev - Add 'standingunder' link to Doug's Aside on Standingunder.)
(27Jan2015 rev - Make page current. Adjust colors.)