Arches

If you're stuck in a browser frame - click here to view this same page in Quantonics!

A Treatise of Human Nature

by David Hume
1739

Per, relevant, and prerequisite Doug's
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
Full Text Review, while-and
Interim-reviewing only AToHN logic-, relations-, probability-, chance-, necessity-, idea-, belief-, cause- and effect-relevant selections

Reviewed by Doug Renselle
starting AToHN Book I, Part IV, Sect. II early December, 2006 and interim-ending late December, 2006.

Doug will eventually review selections from AToHN Book I, Part III, Sections I-XV, pp. 75-163, first 15 of 16 sections, inclusive.
As added review support Doug will review selections from AToHN Book I, Part IV, Sections I-VII, pp. 169-237, all sections of Part IV, inclusive.

Book I - Of the Understanding
Part IV - Of
the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy
SECT. II. - Of Scepticism with Regard to The Senses

AToHN Structure:
Book I
Parts I-IV This web page reviews Book I, Part IV, Sect. II
Book II
Parts I-III
Book III
Parts I-III
 
Each of ten total AToHN Parts has multiple (i.e., ~90 total) Sections from a minimum of II Sections per Part to a maximum of XVI Sections per Part.

In Section II's fifty-seven (ugh!) paragraphs, Doug hits high points, classical vis-à-vis quantum issues and problematics, especially cause and effect, which are classically insoluble.

Doug is just beginning to understand Hume, and genuinely Doug has a long way to go. Hume is, except perhaps for Bergson, our largest challenge thus far. We thought Hume had some quantum instincts, but if you read his last paragraph on this page, you will find that he regards quantum reality (esp. its "sceptical doubt," read "quantum uncertainty") as a "malady," you will see what we are up against. Of course that was Hume in about 1739. Doug in 2006 views Hume's dialectic as our real 'Old Way of Thingk-king' malady, and quantum m¤dalings as Quantonics' 'A New Way of Thinkq~king' interim 'cure.'

SECT. II. - Of Scepticism with Regard to The Senses

IndyPub's
Page
Numbers

Hume's Original AToHN Text.
We use several ref's here: on-line sources, and IndyPub's paperback.
Paperback has 541 total pages plus Appendix.

Doug's Comments.
Relevance: Doug's Review of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
.
See our or C¤l¤r C¤dæs.
 P175 Para 1 Thus the sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even tho' he asserts, that he cannot defend his reason by reason; and by the same rule he must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, tho' he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless, esteem'd it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not ? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings. [Hume, in his last sentence, declares himself a dialectician who practices: formal, mechanical, analytical thing-king. Hume agrees with Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Newton, and Einstein. But dialectic reasoning is bogus. Quantum reality shows us that dialectical reasoning is bogus. Please take a moment now to read our QELR of reason, and read both classical and quantum hermeneutics of reason there. Doug - 10Dec2006.]

Readers be aware that some copies of Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature contain scanning errors: 'he' scanned as 'be,' 'far' scanned as 'fax,' etc. Many words are scanned badly. Lots of punctuation scanning errors, etc. Too, Hume, possibly his translator-editor, uses beau coup 'antient' spellings and punctuations. Often we see "&c." as today's "etc." Hume uses much " ...'d " in place of today's " ...ed." For example, Perceiv'd vis-à-vis perceived. We are leaving original work as is, and attempting to restore text from multiple resources and references (huge work, only obvious repairs so far). Hume's "old spelling" plays hell with our spell checker and we don't want to include that old stuff in our dictionary which is already far too complex due to our QELR. We are learning to just skip those terms of 'antient' spelling and live with it.

Hume uses, possibly his translator-editor uses, [] to mark footnotes and references. We use them too, as part of Quantonics' historic markup signature. Doug usually embeds a date and perhaps Doug and PDR to show ownership of [] contents.

We have automated our violet bold ...

[In HTML a violet bold pattern we use is #660066 for <red,green,blue>; our automated tool looks for that pattern and undoes it and then redoes it; our list of words, classical problematic terms, which need violet bold enhancement evolves even as we write this; to prevent any resets of words, phrases, sentences, which are not on our official classical words problem list, we use #660067; our undo violet bold filter ignores that pattern...]

...markups of classical terms which we consider problematic in any quantum world. They are also a good starting point for criticism and apologies of an author's works. We show them so that you may habituate your own concern for 'classical logic' (bogus; ihn a sænsæ ¤f bæing wr¤ng ihn quantum comtexts...) terms. Readers may compare classical and quantum logics at our coquecigrues. Doug - 8Dec2006.


On with this Sec. II. - Of Scepticism with Regard to The Senses review...

Our review of this first paragraph is huge. We had to establish Hume's anti-sophism and evaluate it. We had to pull paragraphs from other sections of AToHN to do that. You may skip directly to para. 2 if you are uninterested in Hume's anti sophism (read 'anti quantumism').

We have described several titans of thought as having at least partial quantum intuitions. That is n¤t so surprising when one fathoms how all of us, all multiversal living beings, are quintessentially quantum and possesses natureal quantum qua. Significantly, however, a celebrity candidate list includes at least these famous folk:

  • Bergson, Henri Louis (1859-1941); a Doug's hero and mentor; Doug learned how silly dialectic is by studying Bergson
  • Bohm, David (1917-1992); one of Doug's heroes; quasi~mentor; Bohm's hologramic reality is, in Doug's view, best quantum physics predecessor to Quantonics that exists early in Millennium III, though Bohm's explicate order is mechanical...
  • Durant, William James (1885-1981); a phenomenal generalist
  • Geertz, Clifford (1928-2006); quantum anthropologist
  • Gleick, James, author - Genius, Chaos, et al.
  • Ho, Mae-wan (one of Doug's heroines...)
  • Hoffmann, Banesh (an unacknowledged mentor for Doug; learned much from Hoffmann)
  • James, William (1842-1910); quantum psychologist; inaugurated Harvard's school of psychology
  • Kuhn, Thomas (1922-1996); only glimmers of quantum intuitions here
  • Pirsig, Robert M. (1928- ); a Doug hero and unacknowledged mentor; when Doug first read Lila in spring of 1992, Pirsig had been running in background on Doug's quantum stage since Doug's first read of ZMM in about 1985; reading Lila flipped Doug's "It's time to act, to go full pragma, start learning quantum..." switch on, and Doug never looked back after that; Pirsig's opus has altered Doug's life since 1985; Pirsig, in a very palpable way, is Doug's quantum~quality "Master;" Doug never thought that he would say that about another human being, but when Doug heard Clifford Geertz refer Wittgenstein that way, Doug felt great respect for Geertz' abiding humility...and so...
  • Talbot, Michael; adherent of Bohm and Pribram - wrote The Holographic Universe
  • Voltaire (1694-1778); wrote over 100 texts; prolific and exceptionally quantum intuitions...; hated by 'd mofo-mafo-Roman-inane-Church...
  • Zohar, Dana (she and hubby Ian are quantum, through and through)
  • Zukav, Gary (this man "is beyond [any] Pale" of most writers (excepting, in Doug's opinion, Richard Powers); his Dancing Wu Li Masters was our next largest 'magnet' after Pirsig's ZMM and Lila...

We probably missed a few... We'll add them here as we recall them re this locus of hero bettership.

So far, Hume's only apparent quantum qua arises when he seriously role-plays "absolute scepticism." But that phrase itself denies quantum reality by an assumption that absolute uncertainty exists as an ideal dialectical opposite of absolute certainty. And often he shows said qua, we think, even without realizing it. Here is an example:

"Thus the sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even tho' he [Hume's gender hierarchy is catholically, patriarchally abominable. Doug - 10Dec2006.] asserts, that he cannot defend his reason by reason;..." Hume's red bold phrase may be fathomed in at least two ways: classically, and sophistically. Hume, as a dialectician fathoms it in former way, since he hates sophism and sophists. How do we know that? Purpose of Doug's comments here is to juxtapose Hume's view side-by-side Doug's quantum view which we shall offer after next segment of tabularized sophis quotations from Books 1 and 3 of Hume's AToHN. Words with prefix 'sophis' do not appear in Book 2 of AToHN.

We can offer a list of Humean anti sophist paragraphs found during review efforts here in Quantonics (each of these deserves extended commentary, criticism and apology which we will offer when we do detail reviews of those sections of Hume's AToHN...they are luscious to read, plunder, and devour here though...):

Hume AToHN Reference Hume Denigration of Sophism

Hume_AToHN_Book_1.html:

In Doug's view, we see here Hume assuming a reality which is stable, and holds still. He calls that which disagrees with an assumption of stability, "sophistry."

In quantum (sophist) reality, when we draw a triangle, it has a local (actual) depiction quantum~c¤mplæmænting its n¤nl¤cal (n¤nactual) pr¤jæcti¤nings, i.e., quanton(actual,n¤nactual). Hume appears to say that ideas and their 'ideal' Platonic forms 'exist' in actuality and there is dialectically 'no' nonactuality. Doug - 13Dec2006.

B1, P1, S7, para. 8 - For this is one of the most extraordinary circumstances in the present affair, that after the mind has produc'd an individual idea, upon which we reason, the attendant custom, reviv'd by the general or abstract term, readily suggests any other individual, if by chance we form any reasoning, that agrees not with it. Thus shou'd we mention the word triangle, and form the idea of a particular equilateral one to correspond to it, and shou'd we afterwards assert, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to each other, the other individuals of a scalenum and isosceles, which we overlooked at first, immediately crowd in upon us, and make us perceive the falshood of this proposition, tho' it be true with relation to that idea, which we had form'd. If the mind suggests not always these ideas upon occasion, it proceeds from some imperfection in its faculties; and such a one as is often the source of false reasoning and sophistry. But this is principally the case with those ideas which are abstruse and compounded. On other occasions the custom is more entire, and 'tis seldom we run into such errors.

Hume_AToHN_Book_1.html:

Hume defies classical logic here. Contradiction is one way classical logic ideally assesses EOOO classically bivalent untruth. Indeed, classically-ideally, truth means provisional absence of untruth via apparent tentative lack of contradiction. A legal example is apropos here: "...innocent until proven guilty."

Sophisms may n¤t be classically contradicted! And that, friends, is why they are such enormous 'di' 'fficulty!' Why? Sophisms are both_TRUE_and_FALSE temporally, co(m)ntextually, et al. Quantum reality is animate and emerging so its classically apparent verity and falsity are endlessly adapting. So verity and falsity as classical "holds still" stoppable 'ideals' are only classical self-delusions! (This is only one of countless justifications Doug uses to call dialectic "bogus.")

Hume's condescension here exhibits a depth of ignorance partially belying his socially esteemed and celebrated reputation. (Doug admits that, essentially, this apperception, a mostly individual process itself, may be used to describe nearly all of us.) Doug - 13Dec2006.

B1, P2, S2, para. 6 - A demonstration, if just, admits of no opposite difficulty; and if not just, 'tis a mere sophism, and consequently can never be a difficulty.

Hume_AToHN_Book_1.html:

Hume appears to use classical thought to agree with quantum reality here. Points are radically mechanical notions, thus invalid in quantum reality. Indeed classical mathematics' core axioms are radically mechanical! (Independence, free uni context, stoppable Cartesian locus, stable reference frames, reduction, etc.) Doug - 13Dec2006.

B1, P2, S2, para. 10 - These consequences we may carry one step farther, and conclude that all the pretended demonstrations for the infinite divisibility of extension are equally sophistical; since 'tis certain these demonstrations cannot be just without proving the impossibility of mathematical points; which 'tis an evident absurdity to pretend to.

Hume_AToHN_Book_1.html:

Would that Hume could have known Bergson!

Hume's largest problem is his adherence to dialectic.

He makes an interesting observation that classical quantity and classical idea are "opposite" particularly regarding "infinite divisibility."

Further, Hume, "demonstrates" how classical logic's funda impose "absurdities" upon all classical thought using those funda. Doug agrees! Quantum Think~king M¤dæs demonstrate Hume's position here, well.

Actually, from a quantum per intera perspective, classical geometry fails due its most prominent founding axioms: 'identity of objects." To use Hume's word, said axiom is "absurd" in quantum reality. Classical geometry, quantumly, phluxially, is bogus!

Doug - 13,24Dec2006.

B1, P2, S4, para. 32 (penultimate S4 para.; with appendix para. inserted) - This may open our eyes a little, and let us see, that no geometrical demonstration for the infinite divisibility of extension can have so much force as what we naturally attribute to every argument, which is supported by such magnificent pretensions. At the same time we may learn the reason, why geometry fails of evidence in this single point, while all its other reasonings command our fullest assent and approbation. And indeed it seems more requisite to give the reason of this exception, than to shew, that we really must make such an exception, and regard all the mathematical arguments for infinite divisibility as utterly sophistical. For 'tis evident, that as no idea of quantity is infinitely divisible, there cannot be imagin'd a more glaring absurdity, than to endeavour to prove, that quantity itself admits of such a division; and to prove this by means of ideas, which are directly opposite in that particular. And as this absurdity is very glaring in itself, so there is no argument founded on it, which is not attended with a new absurdity, and involves not an evident contradiction.

Hume_AToHN_Book_1.html:

As we have worried, Hume sees mind too as an objective, dialectical concept. How can we be k~n¤wings that? Hume's ...rummage that cell... begs interpretation that a mental container AKA cell, holds — even detends — an idea. If quantum~rælihty is, as we suppose, holographic then Hume's notion of a cell as a holder for an idea is bogus! All memes in any quantum stage are interrelatings all memes in any quantum stage, so all memes in any quantum stage are ubiquitous: everywhere~included~middle~associatings!

Our quantum stages are SOONs, and all of our SOONs are ihn Iht and Iht is ihn all of our SOONs. Quantum reality is massive interrelating multiples of h¤l¤grams cowithihn h¤l¤grams cowithihn h¤l¤grams... all h¤l¤grams are ihn their is¤h¤l¤graphic quantum~c¤mplæmænts and their is¤h¤l¤graphic quantum~c¤mplæmænts are ihn all h¤l¤grams.

We are ihn reserve energy and reserve energy is ihn us.

We offer a quantum~h¤l¤gaphic description of a real massively self~other~interrelating quantum~reality.

We exhibit multiverses as unlimited holographic con(m)sciousnessings of which we all are sharing.

Hume, as have other celebrities, calls our "holographic perspective," classically denigrated as 'animism' "...the cause of many mistakes and sophisms." Doug - 13-14,24Dec2006.

B1, P2, S5, para. 21 - I shall therefore observe, that as the mind is endow'd with a power of exciting any idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches the spirits into that region of the brain, in which the idea is plac'd; these spirits always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces, and rummage that cell, which belongs to the idea. But as their motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the one side or the other; for this reason the animal spirits, falling into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas in lieu of that, which the mind desir'd at first to survey. This change [induced by what Doug calls "quantum reserve energy"] we [classicists] are not always sensible of; but continuing still the same train of thought, make use of the related idea, which is presented to us, and employ it in our reasoning, as if it were the same with what we demanded. This is the cause of many mistakes and sophisms [This is a deluded classical notion: that tapping into reserve energy is a mistake, a sophism; rather, when we learn to use it well our thoughts actually improve and our abilities to deal with reality improve massively... Doug 13-14Dec2006.] in philosophy; as will naturally be imagin'd, and as it wou'd be easy to show, if there was occasion.

Hume_AToHN_Book_1.html:

In a few paragraphs leading into this one Hume denies necessity of cause on grounds of both a posteriori (reverse) induction (lack of a first cause; alternatively nomenclatured and known as "uncaused cause;" philosophical issue: which came first cause? effect? Quantonics asks us to ponder both begin and end...), and dialectically ideal mechanical separability (lisr) of ideas and causes. He says, our intuition that "Whatever has a beginning also has a cause of existence," is not certain.

Adepts of Quantonics will immediately re cognize von Neumann's failed attempts to find quantum special events. Why? Bergson answered like this, "We can analyze a thing, but we cannot analyze a process." Crucially, we realize that intuitions of ideal dialectical objective things are, in quantum reality, wr¤ng. All is pr¤cæss ihn quantum reality. All is n¤n analyzable in quantum reality. We can omnitor, but we can never measure quantitative state: there is n¤ 'classical state.' Quantum reality is unstoppable, absolute flux-change process!

Due our comments and reality as quantum, Hume's dialectical remarks here are just embarrassing. Doug - 14,24Dec2006.

B1, P3, S3, para. 4 - Accordingly we shall find upon examination, that every demonstration, which has been produc'd for the necessity of a cause, is fallacious and sophistical. All the points of time and place, [Mr. Hobbes.] say some philosophers, in which we can suppose any object to begin to exist, are in themselves equal; and unless there be some cause, which is peculiar to one time and to one place, and which by that means determines and fixes the existence, it must remain in eternal suspence; and the object can never begin to be, for want of something to fix its beginning.

Hume_AToHN_Book_1.html:

This one is fascinating!

Hume has just denied "necessity of cause." (On grounds that objects are independent of one another, and it is impossible to establish via a posteriori reverse induction a "first cause.")

Now he uses "consequence."

Aren't 'consequences' by any classical dialectical standard 'necessarily caused?'

If Hume intended, instead, emergent affectation (quantum process without beginning, without end — only emergent change and ongoing phase interrelationshipings...), we could agree, but we are sure, having read paragraphs leading to this one his standard prerequisite for consequence must be cause. Doug - 14Dec2006.

B1, P4, S5, para. 20 - The consequence I shall draw from this may, at first sight, appear a mere sophism; but upon the least examination will be found solid and satisfactory.

Hume_AToHN_Book_1.html:

This paragraph appears to Doug as Hume describing trials and tribulations of pursuing philosophy as an all-consuming mental endeavor.

Doug recalls his first enormous challenges of striving against his own socially-acculturated personal inclinations. SOM is a nearly perfect detention center of mind. Its sidis are high and thick. Its stanchions' tips are kill-sharp barbed. Its moat is deep. Its siren succubi wail wantonly. Its adherents are somnambulating Demos will socially-narcotized hive drones.

Doug struggled massively to escape its mechanical claws, its entrenched cudgels of lisr concrete and stabile immutability. But flux is crux and if you juxtapose flux and stux long enough stux becomes your own worst evil, your own worst nightmare. A nightmare which has wasted, at least in Doug's case, over two score years of a human life. Doug now believes that to unmoor one's classical mental anchorage and unburden its entrapment in classical concrete is manifestly similar spiritual rebirth.

Many of our predecessors grasped that and tried to teach others, but SOM has defended most threats well. However, starting in about 1855 with Jakob Balmer's energy ladder whose rungs are quantized, there is a n¤væl philosophy in town: quantum~philosophy. SOM can't defend this threat. At every turn SOM tries escape there is another quantum meme exposing SOM's real naïve and local incapabilities, its incapacities, its retarded incompetencies. SOM will be renowned, for ever more, as pseudo philosophy, pseudo science, pseudo reason, and pseudo thought. Doug - 14Dec2006.

B1, P4, S7, para. 10 - Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life. But notwithstanding that my natural propensity, and the course of my animal spirits and passions reduce me to this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world, I still feel such remains of my former disposition, that I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy. For those are my sentiments in that splenetic humour, which governs me at present. I may, nay I must yield to the current of nature, in submitting to my senses and understanding; and in this blind submission I shew most perfectly my sceptical disposition and principles. But does it follow, that I must strive against the current of nature, which leads me to indolence and pleasure; that I must seclude myself, in some measure, from the commerce and society of men, which is so agreeable; and that I must torture my brains with subtilities and sophistries, at the very time that I cannot satisfy myself concerning the reasonableness of so painful an application, nor have any tolerable prospect of arriving by its means at truth and certainty[?]. Under what obligation do I lie of making such an abuse of time? And to what end can it serve either for the service of mankind, or for my own private interest? No: If I must be a fool, as all those who reason or believe any thing certainly are, my follies shall at least be natural and agreeable. Where I strive against my inclination, I shall have a good reason for my resistance; and will no more be led a wandering into such dreary solitudes, and rough passages, as I have hitherto met with. [Doug's sic]

Hume_AToHN_Book_3.html:

Hume uses "sophistical" here more in a sense of a caveman viewing 'virtues' of a civilized person as meaningless. Doug - 14Dec2006.

B3, P2, S1, para. 9 - ...It will, perhaps, be said, that my regard to justice, and abhorrence of villainy and knavery, are sufficient reasons for me, if I have the least grain of honesty, or sense of duty and obligation. And this answer, no doubt, is just and satisfactory to man in his civiliz'd state, and when train'd up according to a certain discipline and education. But in his rude and more natural condition, if you are pleas'd to call such a condition natural, this answer wou'd be rejected as perfectly unintelligible and sophistical.

Hume_AToHN_Book_3.html:

Here we observe how a classical mind is genuinely incapable of grasping reality's essence.

Classical minds view reality's animate self-other recapitulative referencings as "reasoning in a circle." Classical concrete lacks qua to recapitulatively self-other refer. So classicists refer that which can recapitulatively self-other refer "sophist."

Circular reasoning to nearly all classicists is "absurd." Doug - 14Dec2006.

B3, P2, S1, para. 18 - From all this it follows, that we have no real or universal motive for observing the laws of equity, but the very equity and merit of that observance; and as no action can be equitable or meritorious, where it cannot arise from some separate motive, there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle. Unless, therefore, we will allow, that nature has establish'd a sophistry, and render'd it necessary and unavoidable, we must allow, that the sense of justice and injustice is not deriv'd from nature, but arises artificially, tho' necessarily from education, and human conventions.

[Of course Hume's words here induce an EOOO of either natural law or artificial anthropocentric'law.' Quantonics hermeneutics of quantum reality begs quanton(physial,physical) where physical is suspect since reality is rhetorical~sophist quantum~phasemental superpositionings of absolutely fluxing waves, n¤t formally state-mental state-ic aggregations of particles. Now we can juxtapose quanton(physial,physical) vis-à-vis quanton(wave,particle). Doug - 10Dec2006.]

Hume_AToHN_Book_3.html:

See Doug's bracketed, embedded remarks.

B3, P2, S5, para. 4, Footnote to para. 4 - [Were morality discoverable by reason, and not by sentiment, `twou'd be still more evident, that promises cou'd make no alteration upon it. Morality is suppos'd to consist in relation. Every new imposition of morality, therefore, must arise from some new relation of objects; and consequently the will cou'd not produce immediately any change in morals, but cou'd have that effect only by producing a change upon the objects. But as the moral obligation of a promise is the pure effect of the will, without the least change in any part of the universe; it follows, that promises have no natural obligation.

[Doug note to Hume's footnote: We agree. Morality is purely qualitative. Morality's belligerent nonregisterability and logical incorrigibility are quantum tells of nature's quantum essence. Thus, in Quantonics, and contrary Hume, quality begs: subjectivity, flux, middle~inclusion, thus waves and waves beg probability. Doug - 9Dec2006.]

[Shou'd it be said, that this act of the will being in effect a new object, produces new relations and new duties; I wou'd answer, that this is a pure sophism, which may be detected by a very moderate share of accuracy and exactness. To will a new obligation, is to will a new relation of objects; and therefore, if this new relation of objects were form'd by the volition itself, we should in effect will the volition; which is plainly absurd and impossible. The will has here no object to which it cou'd tend; but must return upon itself in infinitum. The new obligation depends upon new relations. The new relations depend upon a new volition. The new volition has for object a new obligation, and consequently new relations, and consequently a new volition; which volition again has in view a new obligation, relation and volition, without any termination. `Tis impossible, therefore, we cou'd ever will a new obligation; and consequently `tis impossible the will cou'd ever accompany a promise, or produce a new obligation of morality.] [Those brackets, absent any Doug signification, enclose a Humean footnote - Doug - 9Dec2006.]

Hume_AToHN_Book_3.html:

Similar caveman remarks above. Doug - 14Dec2006.

B3, P2, S9, para. 1 - Those political writers, who have had recourse to a promise, or original contract, as the source of our allegiance to government, intended to establish a principle, which is perfectly just and reasonable; tho' the reasoning, upon which they endeavour'd to establish it, was fallacious and sophistical.


Before Doug, who refers himself "quantum~sophist," starts another rant against anti sophists like Hume, allow a couple of links to Doug's prior works on sophism, and animate self~other~network~everywhere~included~middle~associative~reference (fuzzon~holographic interrelationships) as quantum~sophism:

Doug is about to rant! Doug wants you to know, prior said rant, Doug and Hume omnisagree on:

  • dialectic (classical: analytic, formal, mechanical thing-king)

    compared to

  • rhetoric (quantum: sophist, stochastic, emerscent think~king)

Hume places former above latter. Hume says rhetorical sophism is bogus and claims dialectical mechanism is correct.

Doug, with help of those titans listed just above, has spent decades coming to his comclusion that classical-dialectic is bogus (worse) and quantum~rhetoric is genuine (better). If that compound declaration were not so simple, we would make it a HotMeme™. Yes, it is simple, but inordinately powerful and loaded with potentia vastly beyond and above Western Cultures' current dogma d' province.

Hume, similar Bergson, makes us dig for his 'conclusions.' At least Hume offers some context switching announcements. Bergson seldom does.

Doug believes it is easier for our readers if they grasp where Doug stands, and can more easily recognize omnifferencings among Doug and other writers like Hume, et al.

You may recall how Doug showed that reputedly great sophist haters like Aristotle inadvertently used sophisms to make their 'laws' and viewpoints intellectually palatable. For example, we showed you how Aristotle's three tautologous 'laws' are sophisms! This is important in Doug's rant here. Why? We just saw Hume do something similar in his "Thus the sceptic...cannot defend his reason by reason;"

What is "defend reason by reason?" What is "reason defending reason?" Does that quasi classical state-ment use reason to refer reason? Is Hume using reason to refer itself? Is n¤t reasoning about reason pr¤cæss? Flux? Is n¤t that antithetical dialectical state?

Doug says "Yes!"

What is that which refers self, especially iteratively? A sophism! (O'gadon, notice that sophism is flux: quantum~waves!)

Hume, a great sophism hater, uses sophisms! JKL

Recall our similar remarks re Aristotle?

We are assuming here that Hume believes one may dialectically "defend reason by reason," and further that Hume assumes an "absolute sceptic" ... "cannot defend said sceptic's reason by reason" ... BECAUSE ... any absolute sceptic, to Hume's way of thing-king is analytically "absolutely uncertain." In other words absolute uncertainty disables reason as a defense of reason: absolute uncertainty is dialectically antithetical reason!

How does Hume arrive at such a result? As a dialectician classical certainty is an exact analytic 'opposite' of absolute uncertainty. Classicism assumes one may be either ideally certain or ideally uncertain about classical objects in reality. Quantumism says we are always both partially~certain and partially~uncertain about quantum~memes ihn hlihty. Hume says that sceptics are uncertain about all dialectical statements and thus are "absolutely uncertain." Absolute uncertainty offers 'no' basis for reasoning, especially dialectically. Classical dialectic induces and evokes unlimited notions of absoluteness. Quantum~rhetoric claims flux as its only absolute.

What's wrong? Hume sees classical probability as a manifestation of absolute uncertainty. [Kyburg and Smokler cover this issue extensively in their bravo Studies in Subjective Probability, Wiley, 1964. You will find Bruno de Finetti's 1937 paper, Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources there.] But quantum uncertainty is never absolute: it is a quantum~complementary balance twixt both partial~certainty and partial~uncertainty.

Elsewhere in our Quantonics web site you have seen Doug write, "Quantum reality is abs¤lutæly umcærtain." Doesn't that agree with Hume's notion of sceptics as 'absolutely uncertain?' N¤! Our use of those two words are QELRed. They n¤ longer have classical meanings. Quantum abs¤lutæ issi n¤t classical 'absolute.' Quantum umcærtain issi n¤t classical 'uncertain.' What Doug is saying is that, for example, as Einstein wanted in EPR, we can never assess any classical notion as perpetually true with a "probability equal to one." Quantum~truthings are (quantum rælihty issi) n¤n negative probabilities between classical ideal notions of 'zero' and 'one.' Hume's "absolute sceptic," in Hume's view must adhere dichon(absolute_uncertainty, absolute_certainty). If you understand what we mean by quantum rælihty, then you immediately grasp why that dichon is bogus. To make matters even worse Hume appears to deny probability as an acceptable basis for reason. In our view, Hume is baldly wr¤ng on that one.

How did Hume acquire a belief that probability manifests absolute uncertainty?

Ideal dialectic claims a goal of absolute truth: unmitigated verity, absolute certitude. Probability (waves of absolute change: semper fluxio) simply "changes all and always changes, both faster (up to Planck's frequency) and slower (down to almost n¤ flux, imperceptibly slowly). Dialectic's goal of unequivocal holds-still excluded-middle truth which always states the truth and states all truths may not be achieved in a wave~centric always fluxing quantum~reality. That explicates Doug's claim that dialectic is bogus! See our QELR of absolute. See our Absoluteness as Quantum Uncertainty Interrelationshipings. Those links ask our students to omnistinguish classical absoluteness and quantum~abs¤lutænæss (roughly, ensemble partialities: peaqlos). Hume adheres former. Doug adheres latter.

Classically Dialectical Hume: EOOO(absolute_uncertainty, absolute_certainty); EEMD(absolute_uncertainty, absolute_certainty); dichon(absolute_uncertainty, absolute_certainty)!

Quantumly Rhetorical Doug: BAWAM(partial_uncertainty,partial_certainty); EIMA(partial_uncertainty,partial_certainty); quanton(partial_uncertainty,partial_certainty)!! See detail on BAWAM.

See quantum~partiality.

 P175 Para 2

The subject, then, of our present enquiry is concerning the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of body: And my reasonings on this head I shall begin with a distinction, which at first sight may seem superfluous, but which will contribute very much to the perfect understanding of what follows. We ought to examine apart those two questions, which are commonly confounded together, viz. Why we attribute a continu'd existence to objects, even when they are not present to the senses; and why we suppose them to have an existence DISTINCT from the mind and perception. Under this last head I comprehend their situation as well as relations, their external position as well as the independence of their existence and operation. These two questions concerning the continu'd and distinct existence of body are intimately connected together. For if the objects of our senses continue to exist, even when they are not perceiv'd, their existence is of course independent of and distinct from the perception: and vice versa, if their existence be independent of the perception and distinct from it, they must continue to exist, even tho' they be not perceiv'd. But tho' the decision of the one question decides the other; yet that we may the more easily discover the principles of human nature, from whence the decision arises, we shall carry along with us this distinction, and shall consider, whether it be the senses, reason, or the imagination, that produces the opinion of a continu'd or of a distinct existence. These are the only questions, that are intelligible on the present subject. For as to the notion of external existence, when taken for something specially different from our perceptions, [Part. II. Sect. 6] we have already shewn its absurdity.

Hume shows us his profound dialectical objectivity as basis for his 'reason.'

We can follow his classical 'reason' easily, even though we omnisagree with it, until we encounter his last sentence in this paragraph:

"For as to the notion of external existence, when taken for something specially different from our perceptions, [Part. II. Sect. 6] we have already shewn its absurdity."

That statement, in our view, outright denies quantum~reality.

Can we counter his position easily? We think so. Nature's spectral bandwidth is 143 octaves, if we assume Planck's frequency is a maximum. Human perceptual bandwidth is less than one part in 1021 of that spectrum.

We see that humans can sense and directly perceive only a tiny part of reality's actual spectrum. Is that unsensed part "something specially different?" In a classical sense isn't that part 'external' to our senses? But Hume declares it "absurd" as to its existence! That tiny part is what Hume and most dialecticians mean by 'reality.'

Fathom how our graphic does n¤t show quantum n¤nactuality. If you want a crude memeo of it use our script:

quanton(n¤nactuality,actuality).

Our graphic represents Nature's quantum actuality spectrum.

Doug - 14Dec2006.

 P176 Para 1

To begin with the SENSES, 'tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the continu'd existence of their objects, after they no longer appear to the senses. For that is a contradiction in terms, and suppose that the senses continue to operate, even after they have ceas'd all manner of operation. These faculties, therefore, if they have any influence in the present case, must produce the opinion of a distinct [Doug assumes Hume uses 'di' stinct here as meaning: having 'state' and being 'static.'], not of a continu'd existence [Doug assumes Hume uses continu'd here as similar Bergson's "durational."]; and in order to that, must present their impressions either as images and representations [I.e., ideal classical cinematographic 'stoppability.' Doug.], or as these very distinct and external existences [I.e., ideal abstract Platonic notional 'form.' Some refer this as 'subjective,' but Doug disallows that since those abstractions are ideally and objectively lisr and, by strict mathematical edict, axiomatically independent and they 'hold still.' Quantum reality cann¤t classically 'hold still.' Quantum reality is absolute emerging durational fluxings. Doug - 16Dec2006.].

[Did you notice Hume's "...in order to that...?" Why did he 'not' say, "...in order to do that...?" We see Humean eviction and excision of Jamesean and Peircean pragmatism! In Greek: do, act, pragma. In Greek, act: hypocrisy, role-playing, social encrustation. We see now pragmatism having an essential yet extreme anthropocentric and anthropomorphic odor. By the way, we checked an older, uncopied edition to make sure that absence of 'do' was n¤t a typing ¤r scanning ærr¤r. Doug.]

Please recall Hume's position, just above, re cause and beginning...

Again, we are con(m)cerned. Hume appears n¤t to abide his own narrative. Does he? (When Doug says this, Doug is presuming that Hume is a dialectician and that he, in his own conspective narratives, adheres strictly dialectical formal 'rules,' unless, as we have seen him do with 'absolute sceptics,' sometimes unannounced, he is role-playing an alternate philosophical viewpoint. Latter, we must add, he does quite (extremely) well, in our opinions.)

See our QELR of begin and end.

Hume's "...'tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the continu'd existence of their objects, after they no longer appear to the senses..." offers us a chance to review David Mermin's claim that "the moon isn't there when we are 'not' looking at it." Key word in Mermin quote is 'there.' Some silly DIQheaded classicists say "there is 'no' there there." See potentia. In quantum reality there is always a there there, it just may n¤t bæ where you thought it might be since quantum reality has unlimited con(m)jugates: b¤th actuality amd n¤nactuality EIMA self~other directing networked holographically as — quanton(n¤nactuality,actuality). Too, Mitch's famous query regarding similar.

A fine point here, too, is Hume's semantic for "...continu'd existence of their objects..." Does he mean formal immutable state? Emergent evolutionary durational process? We believe he means former. If he meant latter, he would open his own intellectual, intuitional, and instinctual doors to probability, even subjective nonformal probabilities.

We might also worry about Mermin's use of 'looking.' Can we only 'see' said moon? If it really went away, would not we 'feel' it? Doug - 16Dec2006.

 P176 Para 2

That our senses offer not their impressions as the images of something distinct, or independent, and external, is evident; because they convey to us nothing but a single perception, and never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond. A single perception can never produce the idea of a double existence, but by some inference either of the reason or imagination. When the mind looks farther than what immediately appears to it, its conclusions can never be put to the account of the senses; and it certainly looks farther, when from a single perception it infers a double existence, and supposes the relations of resemblance and causation betwixt them.

[Hume's "...convey to us nothing but a single perception..." is classical thought's greatest single atlantes: monistic monasticism, OSFA thing-king, OGT in OGC, etc. But reality simply isn't a monism, a OSFA system. Reality is an animate heterogeneity. Reality isn't one. Reality is many. Doug - 17Dec2006.]

This paragraph exemplifies what Doug means by "hilt bogosity." Those bold read clauses, to Doug at least, at Millennium III's commencement appear as verbal effluent. Of course, that is only Doug's view and it is a local one, since not all of Hume's narrative strikes Doug's sensitivities as "hilt bogosity." Let's do his fragments serially...

Hume's "...they convey to us nothing but a single perception..." is what Doug intends in this graphic:

How SOMites View Reality

Please use a graphical combination to juxtapose a SOMitic Humean view with Doug's more Quantonic, quantum perspectivings:

Classicists Views vis-à-vis Quantum Views

What Hume writes does not by some formal dialectical 'law' have to hold, and for most of us today in 2006, they simply do not.

Hume's "...never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond. A single perception can never produce the idea of a double existence..."

What about our stairs Möbius 'illusion?' We offer at least hints of "three other beyondings."

Hume's "...conclusions can never be put to the account of the senses..." is absurd even from any classical conspective, isn't it? Isn't that what modern 'science' does? Isn't that what Einstein and his compeers meant by Gedanken experiment?

Ditto his "...never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond. A single perception can never produce the idea of a double existence..." EPR's EPR introduced massively and countless memes and memeos of many, perhaps unlimited "double-multiple existencings." Doug - 17Dec2006.

 P176 Para 3

If our senses, therefore, suggest any idea of distinct existences, they must convey the impressions as those very existences, by a kind of fallacy and illusion. Upon this head we may observe, that all sensations are felt by the mind, such as they really are, and that when we doubt, whether they present themselves as distinct objects, or as mere impressions, the difficulty is not concerning their nature, but concerning their relations and situation.1 Now if the senses presented our impressions as external to, and independent of ourselves, both the objects and ourselves must be obvious to our senses, otherwise they cou'd not be compar'd by these faculties. The difficulty, then, is how far we are ourselves the objects of our senses.

1Paragraphs 250 and 251 of Book 1's massive 1898 T. H. Green AToHN itemized critical review Introduction. Doug - 17Dec2006.

Hume's 'reason' runs into enormous trouble. Why? He tries to use dialectical analyticity to 'reason.' That approach suffers massive issues of incompleteness. That manifests apparently to us, now, in Hume's narrative. What Hume refers "...by a kind of fallacy and illusion..." when viewed quantumly becomes clear and obvious. See Green's Introduction para. 250 link just to left. Hume is attempting to apply objective 'reason' to a quantum reality which is n¤n objective. In retrospect, it simply makes Hume look haphazardly ignorant. He was. Hume was ignorant about quantum reality as flux. He accepted ancients' notions of reality as stux. Hume's many mistakes arise from believing in classical stux when he should have been believing in quantum flux. But first glimmers (Heraclitus, Cratylus, and somewhat Zeno of Elea) of that unfortunately were rejected by Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle. Flux memes and memeos reglimmered 200+ years after Hume published his opus when Jakob Balmer, in 1855, found flux quantization in his quantized wave values for steps in Balmer's now famous ladder formula. Some date this as beginning of quantum theory. Doug dates it (i.e., "early glimmers") starting with Heraclitus.

A lot of this paragraph, from any quantum perspective, is just philosophic anachronism. Green was able to see through it, though he too apparently lacked any intuitions of quantum flux as real essence.

P176 Para 4 

'Tis certain there is no question in philosophy more abstruse than that concerning identity, and the nature of the uniting principle, which constitutes a person. So far from being able by our senses merely to determine this question, we must have recourse to the most profound metaphysics to give a satisfactory answer to it; and in common life 'tis evident these ideas of self and person are never very fix'd nor determinate. 'Tis absurd, therefore, to imagine the senses can ever distinguish betwixt ourselves and external objects.

See our QELR of certain.

See our QELP of identity. See our QELR of identity.

Hume adheres dialectic's EOOO(external, internal) AKA dichon(external, internal). However, quantum reality's flux~middlings are included. Quantumly external is in internal and internal is in external.

Dialectic simply disables classical 'reason,' Humean 'reason.'

 P177 Para 1 Add to this, that every impression, external and internal, passions, affections, sensations, pains and pleasures, are originally on the same footing; and that whatever other differences we may observe among them, they appear, all of them, in their true colours, as impressions or perceptions. And indeed, if we consider the matter aright, 'tis scarce possible it shou'd be otherwise, nor is it conceivable that our senses shou'd be more capable of deceiving us in the situation and relations, than in the nature of our impressions. For since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear. Every thing that enters the mind, being in reality a perception, 'tis impossible any thing shou'd to feeling appear different. This were to suppose, that even where we are most intimately conscious, we might be mistaken.

Hume's "...since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear..." is only classical naïveté. Our bodily senses are limited to HUSB. Any sensory flux outside that range is either n¤n apparent, subliminal, possibly insensible to us. What we sense simply doesn't represent sensory totality for that which is sensed. Our sensory 'data' are naturally incomplete (massively, almost unimaginably so; "nature likes to hide..."): quanton(unsaid,said) similar quanton(unsensed,sensed) and quanton(in_sense_able,sense_able) [We could coin 'sensable' and 'insensable' here: understand that sensible works n¤t here. Too, Doug should use QELRs of 'un' to 'um' and 'in' to 'ihn.' Doug.].

See page 175, para. 2 comments above.

Doug - 20Dec2006.

  P177 Para 2 But not to lose time in examining, whether 'tis possible for our senses to deceive us, and represent our perceptions as distinct from ourselves, that is as external to and independent of us; let us consider whether they really do so, and whether this error proceeds from an immediate sensation, or from some other causes. In any humble, personal realization that we can only sense, with scientific accoutrements' assistance (SHASB), one part in 1021 of reality...we commence re cognizing how our senses deceive us. If we reduce SHASB to HUSB we can only sense one part in 1029.

 P177 Para 3

To begin with the question concerning external existence, it may perhaps be said, that setting aside the metaphysical question of the identity of a thinking - substance, our own body evidently belongs to us; and as several impressions appear exterior to the body, we suppose them also exterior to ourselves. The paper, on which I write at present, is beyond my hand. The table is beyond the paper. The walls of the chamber beyond the table. And in casting my eye towards the window, I perceive a great extent of fields and buildings beyond my chamber. From all this it may be infer'd, that no other faculty is requir'd, beside the senses, to convince us of the external existence of body. But to prevent this inference, we need only weigh the three following considerations. First, That, properly speaking, 'tis not our body we perceive, when we regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions, which enter by the senses; so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain, as that which we examine at present. Secondly, Sounds, and tastes, and smelts, tho' commonly regarded by the mind as continu'd independent qualities, appear not to have any existence in extension, and consequently cannot appear to the senses as situated externally to the body.' The reason, why we ascribe a, place to them, shall be: considered afterwards. Thirdly, Even our sight informs us not of distance or outness (so to speak) immediately and without a certain reasoning and experience, as is acknowledged by the most rational philosophers.

Hume reifies his 'impressions.' Error!

We cann¤t classically reify quantum flux!

Hume commits immense errors of judgment and 'reason' due his ignorance of quantum reality. Most interesting of all is that (Hume's version of) absolute scepticism which Hume declares as "absurd" essentially describes a quantum reality, Quantonics style. Too radical, apparently, for Hume nearly 300 years ago.

Had Hume realized that quantum~impressions are phasistic, he may have made progress. You may find it notable that in his Appendix to Book1, he comes close to admitting his own getting stuckness. Yet he claims that he has only been able to find 'one' 'thing' wrong with his thoughts disclosed herein. Doug - 21Dec2006.

 P178 Para 1

As to the independency of our perceptions on ourselves, this can never be an object of the senses; but any opinion we form concerning it, must be deriv'd from experience and observation: And we shall see afterwards, that our conclusions from experience are far from being favourable to the doctrine of the independency of our perceptions. Mean while we may observe that when we talk of real distinct existences, we have commonly more in our eye their independency than external situation in place, and think an object has a sufficient reality, when its Being is uninterrupted, and independent of the incessant revolutions, which we are conscious of in ourselves.

Quantum reality offers no classical notions of objective independence and stability: Bergson's first two desnouements of two most prototypical classical delusions.

As we can see, Hume worries about that...

 P178 Para 2

Thus to resume what I have said concerning the senses; they give us no notion of continu'd existence, because they cannot operate beyond the extent, in which they really operate. They as little produce the opinion of a distinct existence, because they neither can offer it to the mind as represented, nor as original. To offer it as represented, they must present both an object and an image. To make it appear as original, they must convey a falshood; and this falshood must lie in the relations and situation: In order to which they must be able to compare the object with ourselves; and even in that case they do not, nor is it possible they shou'd, deceive us. We may, therefore, conclude with certainty, that the opinion of a continu'd and of a distinct existence never arises from the senses.

Bergson has taught us well that classical notions of spatial extensity, and a classical human tendency to analytically map reality onto Cartesian extensity, induce abundant error in CTMs.

What we sense is only a tip of its fuller icebergean realness. Classical science uncloaks its own pseudo scientific inclinations by calling an iceberg's 'tip' "real." To any classical 'scientist' lisr classical 'objects' are "real."

Doug - 20Dec2006.

 P178 Para 3

To confirm this we may observe, that there are three different kinds of impressions convey'd by the senses. The - first are those of the figure, bulk, motion and solidity of bodies. The second those of colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat and cold. The third are the pains and pleasures, that arise from the application of objects to our bodies, as by the cutting of our flesh with steel, and such like. Both philosophers and the vulgar suppose the first of these to have a distinct continu'd existence. The vulgar only regard the second as on the same footing. Both philosophers and the vulgar, again, esteem the third to be merely perceptions and consequently interrupted and dependent beings. This is just all analytic objective propertyesque pseudo science crap. Doug.

 P178 Para 4

Now 'tis evident, that, whatever may be our philosophical opinion, colours, sounds, heat and cold, as far as appears to the senses, exist after the same manner with motion and solidity, and that the difference we make betwixt them in this respect, arises not from the mere perception. So strong the prejudice for the distinct continu'd existence Of the former qualities, that when the contrary opinion is advanc'd by modern philosophers, people imagine they can almost refute it from their feeling and experience, and that their very senses contradict this philosophy. 'Tis also evident, that colours, sounds, &c. are originally on the same footing with the pain that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from a fire; and that the difference betwixt them is founded neither on perception nor reason, but on the imagination. For as they are confest to be, both of them, nothing but perceptions arising from the particular configurations and motions of the parts of body, wherein possibly can their difference consist? Upon the whole, then, we may conclude, that as far as the senses are judges, all perceptions are the same in the manner of their [Humean-presumed objective] existence.

Our brackets, bold and color in Hume's text...

Yes, flux exists! Flux has many, nearly unlimited, manifestations both palpable and (classically) phenomenal. "...colours, sounds, heat, cold,...motion and solidity are all palpable manifestations of quantum flux!

In any sense of their being flux, that is their 'sameness.' But omniffering frequencies manifest omniffering quantum manifestations. Sound frequency is much lower than light frequency. Light frequency is much lower than a rock's frequency. Fermions (e.g., rock) are usually "higher energy" thus "higher flux" than bosons (light). We and nature can make photon torpedoes which break this rule, but that is n¤t 'the' norm (assuming our multiverses as we see them now represent ~normalcy). Note that fermions which we induce to behave as bosons (we call these strange quantons "BECs") become weightless! How? Their energy which usually emerses as more localized "mass" spreads out as macroscopically, arbitrarily omnistributed "energy." We will have to do something very similar to this if we want to achieve antigravity technology. Doug is working on some breakthrough antigravity memes nowings.

But Hume insists on objectifying flux: ERROR! Why does Hume do this? His dialectic won't work without reification of 'every' lisr classical 'thing.' But we are teaching our students that we must welcome flux and drive out stux! A nascent self~process emergent quantum~n¤vælty is to commence straddling as quanton(flux,stux).

 P179 Para 1 We may also observe in this instance of sounds and colours, that we can attribute a distinct continu'd existence to objects without ever consulting REASON, or weighing our opinions by any philosophical principles. And indeed, whatever convincing arguments philosophers may fancy they can produce to establish the belief of objects independent of the mind, 'tis obvious these arguments are known but to very few, and that 'tis not by them, that children, peasants, and the greatest part of mankind are induc'd to attribute objects to some impressions, and deny them to others. Accordingly we find, that all the conclusions, which the vulgar [hoi polloi; common proletariat and bourgeoisie; middle and lower classes] form on this head, are directly' contrary to those, which are confirm'd by philosophy. For philosophy informs us, that every thing, which appears to the mind, is nothing but a perception, and is interrupted, and dependent on the mind: whereas the vulgar confound perceptions and objects, and attribute a distinct continu'd existence to the very things they feel or see. This sentiment, then, as it is entirely unreasonable, must proceed from some other faculty than the understanding. To which we may add, that as long as we take our perceptions and objects to be the same, we can never infer the existence of the one from that of the other, nor form any argument from the relation of cause and effect ; which is the only one that can assure us of matter of fact. Even after we distinguish our perceptions from our objects, 'twill appear presently, that we are still incapable of reasoning from the existence of one to that of the other: So that upon the whole our reason neither does, nor is it possible it ever shou'd, upon any supposition, give us an assurance of the continu'd and distinct existence of body. That opinion must be entirely owing to the IMAGINATION: which must now be the subject of our enquiry.

Classical dialectical reason is broken, it simply does not work! Those who keep using it are doomed to ultimate failure, period!

Hume's prose here bears proximity with Gn¤stic topos: hylic (objective materialists), psychic (quantitative dialectical intellectualists; DIQheads), pneumatic (qualitative hermeneutic sophist animists; QICheads). Yes! Doug did use that word: animist! That topos is an evolutionary Chautauqua! We start out as state-ic evolutionary materialists, and grow into intellectualists, and interim 'arrive' at being protean~quantum~sophists (semantic here is "growing closer to becoming spiritually one" with reality). For Doug flux is spirit and Iht issi quantum~real!

Hume then concludes that quantum reality is imagination...Dialectic imposes such poor judgment upon its adherents.

Doug - 20Dec2006.

 P179 Para 2 Since all impressions are internal and perishing existences, and appear as such, the notion of their distinct and continu'd existence must arise from a concurrence of some of their qualities with the qualities of the imagination, and since this notion does not extend to all of them, it must arise from certain qualities peculiar to some impressions. 'Twill therefore be easy for us to discover these qualities by a [state-ic, stoppable, stable] comparison of the [dialectical, analytic, objective] impressions, to which we attribute a distinct and continu'd existence, with those, which we regard as internal and perishing.

Our brackets, bold, and color.

This paragraph illustrates Hume's incredible potential quantum genius juxtaposed his classical mental anchors.

Green bold is tending quantum...

But his "...all impressions are internal and perishing existences..." anticipates J. C. Maxwell's bogus theory of thermodynamics, especially Maxwell's infantile notions of single gradient posentropy.

Simply, quantum flux is imperishable. Whether it be isonic, bosonic, and fermionic. Doug - 21Dec2006.

See entropa.

 P180 Para 1 We may observe, then, that 'tis neither upon account of the involuntariness of certain impressions, as is commonly suppos'd, nor of their superior force and violence, that we attribute to them a reality, and continu'd existence, which we refuse to others, that are voluntary or feeble. For 'tis evident our pains and pleasures, our passions and affections, which we never suppose to have any existence beyond our perception, operate with greater violence, and are equally involuntary, as the impressions of figure and extension, colour and sound, which we suppose to be permanent beings. The heat of a fire, when moderate, is suppos'd to exist in the fire; but the pain, which it causes upon a near approach, is not taken to have any being, except in the perception.

Classical observation assumes unilateralness. Quantum coobsfection assumes quantum wholeness of us ihn Iht and Iht ihn us.

To assist at least a partial cure of Hume's 'reasoning' ills, we should view reality as a quantum~animate (animist) holographing. Our quantum stages and whole beings are ihn Iht and Iht ihn us. Fire is a hologram ihn Iht and Iht ihn us.

Reality is flux. We are flux. Fire is flux. And so on... Flux does quantonic~interrelationshipings which we call "quantum~phasicities" whose interrelationshipings emerq quantum~holographings.

Pain is quantonic~interrelationshipings.

 P180 Para 2 These vulgar [again, common, common sense, totalitarian OSFA Marxian dialectical communist, commonist sense...] opinions, then, being rejected, we must search for some other hypothesis, by which we may discover those peculiar qualities in our impressions, which makes us attribute to them a distinct and continu'd existence.

Our brackets, bold, and color.

What Hume wants as his version of reality is "...distinct and continu'd existence..."

His "distinct" begs lisr.

His "continu'd existence" begs y=f(t). But quantum hlihty issi neihther lisr objective, n¤r y=f(t) continuous. Quantum reality is chunky like a good peanut butter. It's bosonic and fermionic 'building block' chunks (photons, electrons, and nucleons) are quanta: packets of flux whose existences are, while undisturbed in actuality, perpetual. When disturbed, those PMM chunks do not suddenly cease existence, rather continue their perpetuity as transemerqants. Essence of quantum change and evolution! Doug - 21Dec2006.

 P180 Para 3 After a little examination, we shall find, that all those objects, to which we attribute a continu'd existence, have a peculiar constancy, which distinguishes them from the impressions, whose existence depends upon our perception. Those mountains, and houses, and trees, which lie at present under my eye, have always appear'd to me in the same order; and when I lose sight of them by shutting my eyes or turning my head, I soon after find them return upon me without the least alteration. My bed and table, my books and papers, present themselves in the same uniform manner, and change not upon account of any interruption in my seeing or perceiving them. This is the case with all the impressions, whose objects are suppos'd to have an external existence; and is the case with no other impressions, whether gentle or violent, voluntary or involuntary.

Hume is right, in our intuited inference of his suggestion, that quantum persistence and quantum flux vary massively.

This phenomenon shows us that quantum uncertainty has a kind of inertia. Too, though, paradox is ever present. Mountains, and say Earth itself, are huge ensembles of fermions. Their aggregate masses are enormous. But that does not eliminate quantum uncertainty.

If we look at a mountain over a 10 million year period we will see that it has uncertainty, but that uncertainty has more inertia than say a human being or a pond in one's back yard. But when a mountain changes its changes are larger too.

Similarly our solar system appears relatively 'certain,' but if we took a long perspective we would see huge uncertainties and huge affectings.

See IPAC, MTBUE, PSIUE, QTP, QVP.

We believe it is also worthwhile to consider macroscopic uncertainty in terms of partiality too. E.g., quanton(unsaid,said). View macroscopic certainty as Hume does in cell left as a partial of said. Then view macroscopic uncertainty quantonically as quanton(unsaid,apparent_certainty), i.e., as macroscopic certainty's perhaps as yet unsaid. Comet Levi Shoemaker and planet Jupiter immediately come to mind... December 26, 2004 Indonesian tsunami comes to mind...

See uncertainty, macroscopic uncertainty, and Zeno's Intuition of Macroscopic Quantum Uncertainty.

Doug - 21Dec2006.

 P180 Para 4 This constancy, however, is not so perfect as not to admit of very considerable exceptions. Bodies often [macroscopic quantum uncertainlly] change their position and qualities, and after a little absence or interruption may become hardly knowable. But here 'tis observable, that even in these changes they preserve a coherence [Classical? Quantum?], and have a regular dependence [Quantum change as emergent? Classical change as analytic predicable mechanical interaction force?] on each other; which is the foundation of a kind of reasoning from causation, and produces the opinion of their continu'd existence [Hume concludes 'classical' to both. Doug - 21Dec2006.]. When I return to my chamber after an hour's absence, I find not my fire in the same situation, in which I left it: But then I am accustomed in other instances to see a like alteration produc'd in a like time, whether I am present or absent, near or remote. This [Humean classical] coherence, therefore, in their changes is one of the characteristics of external objects, as well as their constancy. Our embedded bracket comments cover our discussion for this paragraph.
 P181 Para 1 Having found that the opinion of the continu'd existence of body depends on the COHERENCE, and CONSTANCY of certain impressions, I now proceed to examine after what manner these qualities give rise to so extraordinary an opinion. To begin with the coherence; we may observe, that tho' those internal impressions, which we regard as fleeting and perishing, have also a certain coherence or regularity in their appearances, yet 'tis of somewhat a different nature, from that which we discover in bodies.' Our passions are found by experience to have a mutual connexion with and dependence on each other; but on no occasion is it necessary to suppose, that they have existed and operated, when they were not perceiv'd, in order to preserve the same dependence and connexion, of which we have had experience. The case is not the same with relation to external objects. Those require a continu'd existence, or otherwise lose, in a great measure, the regularity of their operation. I am here seated in my chamber with my face to the fire; and all the objects, that strike my senses, are contain'd in a few yards around me. My memory, indeed, informs me of the existence of many objects ; but then this information extends not beyond their past existence, nor do either my senses or memory give any testimony to the continuance of their being. When therefore I am thus seated, and revolve over these thoughts, I hear on a sudden a noise as of a door turning upon its hinges; and a little after see a porter, who advances towards me. This gives occasion to many new reflections and reasonings. First, I never have observ'd, that this noise cou'd proceed from any thing but the motion of a door ; and therefore conclude, that the present phaenomenon is a contradiction to all past experience, unless the door, which I remember on t'other side the chamber, be still in being. Again, I have always found, that a human body was possest of a quality, which I call gravity, and which hinders it from mounting in the air, as this porter must have done to arrive at my chamber, unless the stairs I remember be not annihilated by my absence. But this is not all. I receive a letter, which upon, opening it I perceive by the